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 This thesis is about the Guatemalan university student movement and its interactions with 
the National Police from 1952 to 1956. In order to better understand this relationship, the thesis 
also analyses the transformations, fragmentation, contradictions and relations of solidarity among 
the university students. The dates encompass the last years of the revolutionary period (1944-
1954) and first years of the counterrevolution (1954-1957).  Relations between the student 
movement and the police in each political period are different and of key significance because 
the contrast set the course for the three decades of violence and armed conflict that would follow 
(1960-1996). Analysis of the actions of the student movement and the responses of the National 
Police during the revolution, provides a better understanding whether the police as a State 
institution abided by the democratic ideals professed by the revolutionary leaders. During the 
counterrevolution, the anticommunist ideology of the country’s leaders transformed the structure 
and rhetoric of the National Police to make them compatible, which in turn guided police 
response to the opposition, epitomized by the student movement.  These responses marked the 
beginning of the use of institutionalized violence of the State against its citizens.  
 The thesis is based on a vast array of primary sources including, newspaper articles of the 
time, personal interviews with some of the protagonists, and internal university documents and 
bulletins. But what allowed this thesis to provide original insight about the police, was the access 
 
granted to the Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional, accidentally discovered four years ago in 
Guatemala City, and at the time of my research, closed to the public. The archives are believed to 
be one of the most complete police archives in all of Latin America, since they encompass more 
than a century (1882-1996) and it is estimated they contain about 80 million pages of documents. 
There is currently very little work on the history of the Guatemalan National Police, and when it 
comes to its structure and operational methods the information is almost inexistent. This thesis is 
only the beginning of what hopefully can be a long-lasting relationship between researchers and 
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The Importance of the Historical Period 
 
 
Cualquier forma de aplicación de la ley no sólo está determinada por el conocimiento que se 
tenga del derecho, sino por el grado de sensibilidad humana y social que priven en el ánimo 
del juzgador.              




 “Everyone sees things from their own point of view,” an anticommunist student leader told 
me when he described the benefits of a militarized police in the counterrevolutionary and Jorge 
Ubico era.2 There was order and there was peace, he stressed.  While trying to piece this project 
together, I found this phrase to be very useful in describing the different political and public 
positioning university students took in regards to the National Police during two very different 
political regimes in Guatemala during the 1950’s. While for the conservative anticommunist 
student group the police during the revolutionary government was corrupt and repressive, for 
students belonging to other university associations, the police was a respectful institution. The 
coup of 1954 and subsequent counterrevolution would completely change this equation. With the 
new conservative and military government, the same anticommunist students portrayed the 
police as a well-organized and efficient force while students in associations more politically 
                                                        
1 “Any form of law enforcement only is not only determined by the knowledge of the law, but by the degree of 
social and human sensibility in the spirit of the one who judges.” Carlos Guzmán Böckler is a Guatemalan lawyer 
and sociologist. 
 
2 His exact phrasing was a popular Spanish saying: “Cada quien habla de la feria como le va en ella”. Jorge Ubico 
was president of Guatemala from 1931 to 1944. He was a liberal ruler one of a series of depression dictators that 
ruled through Latin America during the years coinciding with the Great Depression. He instituted vagrancy laws to 
force landless peasants mainly indigenous to work for landowners for free. The police played an important role 
during his rule by making sure his laws were enacted. Ubico’s Secret Police was also well known for brutally 
repressing all opposition.  
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involved saw a transformed institution, repressive in its legal nature and under the command of 
an anticommunist driven state focused on ridding all opposition from the country.  
This thesis examines two specific events of student participation and protest and the 
responses to both by the Guatemalan National Police. These events help provide a better 
understanding of the internal and legal changes of the Police, and also of the student movement 
as well. The confrontations occurred in two different political regimes: the Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán’s presidency from 1951 to 1954, encompassing the second half of the ten-year 
revolutionary government of Guatemala, and the presidency of Carlos Castillo Armas, the leader 
of the counterrevolution and president from 1954 to 1957.3 The first event analyzed took place in 
June of 1952, when newspaper headlines alerted the population of sabotage tactics affecting 
electric plants in the outskirts of Guatemala City.  The “Atentados Dinamiteros”, as the 
bombings became known, were carried out by an anticommunist group of students who strongly 
opposed the Arbenz government and considered it a communist regime. The group attempted to 
use the bombing as a destabilizing tactic to spark a nation wide revolt to oust the government. 
While their plan was unsuccessful, some of their members were arrested and the students later 
made claims of undergoing torture while in police custody. The allegations of torture placed 
pressure on the security forces and on the democratic government itself. The sabotage acts, 
moreover, prompted solidarity between the university student associations who disapproved of 
any cruel and unlawful methods of punishment.4 Many students associations publicly supported 
the anticommunist students even though most did not agree with their ideology.  
                                                        
3 The ten-year period from 1944 to 1954 is considered the Guatemalan Revolution. The first president of the 
revolutionary era was Juan José Arévalo, who was also the first democratically elected president of Guatemala. The 
second president was Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán who took power in 1951 and whose term planned to end in 
1956 was cut short a Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, inspired 1954 coup.  
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These students associations criticized the government and the National Police for the alleged 
use of non-democratic tactics to deal with the opposition. However, in order to understand police 
actions, it is necessary to analyze its transformation during the revolution. In “democratic nations 
police forces are the state institutions that carry the prime responsibility for law enforcement and 
the use of force to re-establish social order.” For the most part, democratic regimes modify the 
“legal frameworks, selection criteria, […] accountability mechanisms” of institutions like the 
police in order to address past violation from authoritarian regimes.5 This was not the case in 
Guatemala, while selection criteria and emphasis on behavior of the new police force did take 
place, a change in the legal framework of the institution did not. The revolutionary governments 
never transformed the Ley orgánica of the National Police.6 The government made various 
legislative structural changes in other State institutions but not in the police, a force that had 
gained a reputation in the past dictatorship of Jorge Ubico for its repressive conduct. The 
documents from the Police Archives analyzed, show that the emphasis of the government at the 
time was on reform of the police force ethos, not its institutional form and rules. The 
revolutionary authorities placed emphasis on the attitudes and behaviors police officers were 
expected to have, their duty was to serve and expand the revolution and make it a source of 
pride.  
Excessive use of force attributed to both revolutionary presidents is important to study 
because “the repressive acts attributed to the October Revolution, especially to the Arbenz 
                                                        
4 The university had many student associations as the time since each faculty had its own and then the AEU was the 
umbrella organization that encompassed students from all faculties and was the official public voice of university 
students.  
 
5 Quirine A. M. Eijkman, We Are Here to Serve You!: Police Security, Police Reform and Human Rights 
Implementation in Costa Rica (Intersentia, 2007), 18. 
 
6 The Ley Orgánica is the Organic Law that governs and lists the statutes of the Guatemalan National Police. The 
one in effect when the revolution took power was the one instituted in 1940 by Jorge Ubico. 
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administration constitute one of the many black holes of our contemporary history.”7 Thus 
learning and understanding these black holes is necessary to better comprehend the period of the 
revolution and see it in a more balanced way, without romanticizing or demonizing it by 
exaggerating the violent responses against opposition. It is also important to understand the 
climate from which the accusations of abuses surfaced. They were born out of an ideological and 
political conflict in part fed by the propaganda of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, the 
ultraconservative beliefs of a Catholic Church with an anticommunist agenda, and the landed 
elites who felt their position in the country threatened by the various social reforms 
implemented. These powers managed to lure onto their side the middle classes, some 
conservative, and some simply misinformed of what the reforms meant for them. 
Whereas the revolutionary government failed to enact structural legal changes for the 
National Police, the counterrevolutionary junta did not. The counterrevolutionary government 
was quick to make legal reforms to place the police at the executive’s disposition and organize it 
into a communist fighting machine, not only targeting members of the communist party, Partido 
Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT, but also using the term to encompass all opposition. The second 
incident analyzed in this thesis took place in this new political climate. In 1956, a student march 
took place to peacefully protest the violent and illegal actions incurred by security forces during 
the commemoration of the death of a martyr of the 1944 revolution. The government ordered the 
National Police to open fire against the students and cancelled all constitutional guarantees with 
the pretext that a communist insurrection was underway. The response chosen by the government 
clearly demonstrated that the Cold War’s principle of fighting communism would dictate the 
path of future responses that the Guatemalan State would take toward the opposition. The way in 
                                                        
 
7 Piero Gleijeses, La esperanza rota: La revolución Guatemalteca y los Estados Unidos, 1944-1954 (Guatemala: 
Editorial Universitaria, 2005).  
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which the government directed and used the security forces as its new tool to fight the 
communist threat marked a beginning of institutionalized violence in the country.  
After analyzing both periods and the events in each, I propose that despite a brief democratic 
period a true change of actions from the police forces was hard to achieve especially without the 
proper structural changes to its legislation. A change in the laws of the police was necessary 
because then “the law, rather than political power, provides the framework for policing, […] by 
being accountable to the law rather than the government […] the police supports democratic 
development within modern society.”8 While the revolutionary government did its best to create 
and present a reformed and democratic institution, its attempt was only focused in reforming 
police ideology to make it compatible with the new democratic era. The attempt to reform the 
police was tarnished by accusations of torture and human right violations. The possible validity 
of the accusations was made stronger by the same fact that the government had not given the 
police a new law that would legitimize the institution in the public eye.  Changing police conduct 
and instituting new democratic ideals is complex but the creation of new “institutional 
frameworks, encourages the actual social change.”9 The counterrevolutionary government did 
understand the need to combine the structural and ideological change to achieve a complete 
transformation and to better control the Police. The government structured the Police Code in a 
way that law and ideology were compatible and worked together to fight the opposition by 









Historical Background  
To understand the events presented in this thesis, it is necessary to know more about the 
political context in which they developed. The 1929 the stock market crash of the United States 
followed by the Great Depression meant a transformation for the governments in many Latin 
American countries, whose economies where dependant on U.S. investment and trade. In most 
countries the solution to their economic and political crisis meant an emergence of dictators with 
authoritarian policies aimed to assist the upper classes and foreign industries. In Guatemala such 
dictator was General Jorge Ubico, who was in power from 1931 to 1944, ruling with an iron fist. 
After a 14-year dictatorship, all sectors of society demanded Ubico’s resignation. On October 20, 
1944 students alongside teachers and workers joined a group of young military officers to oust 
all remnants of Ubico’s regime. A junta of two young officers, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
and Major Francisco Javier Arana, and one civilian, Jorge Toriello, took power but quickly held 
general elections. In March 1945, Juan José Arévalo became the first democratically elected 
president of Guatemala. During his presidency, Arévalo created a Social Security system and 
also passed the Labor Law of 1947, which set a minimum wage and legalized rural labor unions, 
and it also forbade wage discrimination on the basis of race and gender.10  
Colonel Jacobo Arbenz became the second president of this democratic period by 
receiving 65 percent of the votes in the 1950 election. A major achievement of his term was the 
implementation of an agrarian reform in 1952, through Decree 900. The reform allowed for the 
expropriation of uncultivated lands to be given to landless peasants so to empower them and 
involve them in the capitalist system as owners and producers. In two years hundreds of 
                                                        
10 Cindy Forster, The Time Of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala's October Revolution, (University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2001). 
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thousands of peasants across Guatemala mobilized to claim land.11 These reforms, created major 
instability in the country on the part of the middle class, the elite, the church, certain sectors of 
the military and American interests represented by the United Fruit Company, UFCO, all who 
saw their possessions and status threatened. The October revolution of 1944 survived ten years, 
the “ten years of spring” as they have become known. In 1954 Jacobo Arbenz was forced to 
resign by the CIA-funded opposition coalition of middle classes, army officers and elites.12 
After Arbenz resigned, Colonel Castillo Armas took power. Castillo Armas was a 
military officer exiled in Honduras where he along with other opposition groups received support 
from the CIA to launch an invasion and overthrow the government. He retracted most of the 
reforms of the revolutionary period, returned confiscated lands to elites and the UFCO. He also 
began a period of repression against all of Arbenz’s supporters in both the countryside as well as 
in the urban areas of Guatemala City. Castillo and his successors would be the first of many 
other military leaders whom until 1985, through a series of fraudulent elections and coup 
’d’états, would ascend to power and launch attacks against perceived communists.   
Moreover, while the two events I focus on are very specific it is necessary to also understand 
the historical role of the two main actors of this thesis, the university students organized in 
different associations and the National Police. It is especially important to understand their 
transformations after the 1944 revolution, since it marked the end of a dictatorship and the 
beginning of a democratic regime. For the most part student movements have played very 




12 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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something of a ‘conscience’ for their societies, as they often embody the concerns of broader 
segments of the population who are unable to voice their discontent.”13  
During the time period I focused on, Guatemala had only one university, the Universidad de 
San Carlos de Guatemala established in 1676.14 Within its walls, on May 22, 1920, a group of 
students from the different colleges of the university established the Association of University 
Students, AEU.15 Its task was not only to be involved with university activities, but also to take a 
participatory role in the country’s politics. The founders of the AEU, aimed at forming university 
students that would maintain “a critical attitude towards government authorities.”16 But under 
Ubico’s dictatorship due to his emphasis on order and obedience, the AEU was abolished. Yet, 
despite the prohibitions, in 1943, World War II’s rhetoric of freedom and justice as well as 
growing internal discontent triggered students to restore the past student associations like the 
AEU and El Derecho, the association of the law school.17 The student leaders began to challenge 
the internal politics of the university by asking for new deans, the return of autonomy, technical 
schools for workers and the creation of a humanities program. As their demands increased, 
                                                        
13 Philip G. Altbach, “Student Politics in the Third World,” Higher Education 13, no. 6 (December 1984): 635-
655:637. 
 
14 The University of San Carlos Guatemala, USAC, was established in 1676, one of the first universities of the new 
world. It mostly served as a theological college until the liberal period of the 1800’s, when it underwent several 
changes that included liberal ideals. The university was secularized and given relative autonomy from the state. As 
the university grew, so did the organizational structure of the student body, and each college developed their own 
academic student organizations.  
 
15 Horacio Cabezas, “AEU 1” (Unpublished Manuscript).  
 
16 Virgilio Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras: universidad y movimiento estudiantil en Guatemala 
(Guatemala: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2002), 162. 
 
17 Historically, the faculties and associations of Law and Medicine have been the most political in the University of 
San Carlos. This does not mean that other faculties did not participate or were not political, they were, but to a lesser 
scale. At the time all students enrolled in the university automatically became part of the AEU. However the 
Asociación el Derecho, the student association that represented the law faculty distinguished itself for its political 
role and because of it many considered it more important than the AEU, which tended to present a more moderate 
view since it encompassed all faculties. The influence of these university student associations was so important that 
newspapers at the time followed as important news the associations’ internal elections. 
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students began to shape a more democratic and open institution willing to stand up to the 
dictatorship turning their academic demands into political ones. As a response to the students’ 
disregard for his laws, Ubico eliminated constitutional guarantees and citizen rights. However 
this only led to student strikes that were rapidly joined by other dissatisfied sectors of society 
who finally ousted him in 1944.18 
Some of the university students’ discontentment was due to academic stagnation in the 
university, a result from the policies of the dictatorship. Ubico imposed quotas on enrollment, 
and instituted tuition payment requirements, given that it was a public university, in prior years 
students did not have to pay tuition. These rules limited the number as well as social status of 
people who attended the university during those years. As a result, in 1944 the year the 
revolution overthrew Ubico’s regime, only 705 students were registered and out of all only 30 
were women.19 At the same time, since the university reforms of Cordobá Argentina in 1918, a 
movement spread throughout Latin American universities demanding university autonomy.20 
Students deemed autonomy as necessary to achieve a truly open and challenging academic 
center. In Guatemala, until 1944, the executive chose all deans, directors and even faculty of the 
university. Career options after graduation were also very limited and that had created friction 
                                                        
18 Gleijeses, Esperanza rota; Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras; Augusto Cazali Ávila, “25 Años de 
autonomía universitaria,” Revista Alero, February 1971; Manuel Galich, Del pánico al ataque, 2nd ed. (Guatemala: 
Editorial Universitaria, 1977). 
 
19 Augusto Cazali Ávila, Historia de la universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, época republicana (1821-1994) 
(Guatemala, Centroamérica: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1997), 257, 260, 262. 
In 1932 the Secretary of Education in his report to the executive stated that the university was being led into a good 
direction, one of the causes being the establishment of quotas, which put an end to the “threatening 
professionalization of the proletarian.” Starting in 1938, as part of the quota system, each faculty could only enroll 
50 new students.  
 
20 A part of the basis for the long struggle for university autonomy were the Cordoba reforms originated in 
Argentina which provided the basis for the demand of university autonomy throughout Latin American Universities.  
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within the student body. It had become more difficult for young professionals to get jobs, which 
at the same time affected their possibilities for a stable income.21 
The growing number of repressive and failed economic measures facilitated the coalescence 
of various social groups, who opposed the dictatorship. Some elites also joined in the growing 
movement, especially those who wanted a change in economic policy specifically a move 
towards industrialization, as other Latin American countries had done. This change in economic 
policy was something that Ubico with his finquero mentality would not allow because “Ubico 
and his associates aged while the world rejuvenated.”22  
On June 24th 1944, a group of citizens including students drafted what has become known as 
the Memorial de los 311, a document sent to Ubico where the population requested the 
reestablishment of constitutional guarantees. Since the demands were not met, the students called 
for a general strike and led several marches demanding the resignation of Ubico. On June 25th 
protests continued, the security forces violently attempted to repress a women’s demonstration 
and killed teacher Maria Chinchilla, who would become an icon of the struggle for freedom.23 As 
a result of the social pressures and without support from the American government, Ubico 
resigned on June 30th 1944. Guatemala City served as the stage for the events, and this was the 
first and last time that all social classes, who were discontented in one way or another, would 
unite and fight together. 
After Ubico’s resignation, power was transferred to a military triumvirate in which 
Federico Ponce Vaides surfaced as the principal leader. However, a desire for change had 
                                                        
21 Carlos Guzmán Böckler, “Para  rememorar el 20 de octubre de 1944: una reflexión previa y necesaria” (Al 
Grano), 9. 
 
22 Ibid, 8 Finquero refers to a landowner.  
 
23 Maria Chinchilla was a teacher who participated in women and teachers’ demonstration on the afternoon of the 
25th. When the police was sent to disperse the march, they fired against the people congregated. Maria Chinchilla 
was killed with a gunshot to the face.  
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sparked within Guatemalan society, soon alliances formed between civilians and a section of the 
military with young people serving as a common denominator between both sectors. In October 
20th 1944 a group of university students and junior military officers initiated a rebellion in the 
Guardia de Honor brigade and a tripartite junta made up of civilian Jorge Toriello, Major 
Francisco Javier Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán took power.24 The National Police 
was disbanded and university students as well as Boy Scouts took charge of maintaining order in 
the city until a new police force could be recruited. General elections were called for and a multi-
sector coalition, comprised of students and teachers, united under the banner of the Frente 
Popular Libertador party, supported the candidacy of Juan José Arévalo. Arévalo won the 
presidency with 86 percent of the votes and his term that began in 1945 marked the beginning of 
the ten-year democratic opening in the country. A new constitution was drafted that same year 
and for the first time the youth took control of the political power. Arévalo was 40 years old, his 
cabinet was comprised of young individuals, and the average age of the congressmen and 
representatives was 26.25 Many were still university students, and even while they worked in the 
Guatemalan congress, they continued attending classes.26  This group of young people took on 
the most important task of setting off and transforming into actions the ideals drafted in their new 
constitution. As one of the first reforms the University of San Carlos was granted autonomy and 
provided with economic independence.27 
                                                        
24 Gleijeses, Esperanza rota.  
 
25 Carlos Guzmán Böckler, “Respuesta para la Revista Encontrarte,” March 21, 2006. Jacobo Arbenz was 37 years 
old when he took power as Arévalo’s successor. 
 
26 Carlos Guzmán Böckler, “Entrevista Carlos Guzmán Böckler,” Oral Interview, August 2008. 
 
27 Alvarez A., Conventos, Aulas Y Trincheras. The revolutionary government allocated two percent of the national 
budget to the University. 
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This period is extremely important because it was one of the few, if not the only time, 
when social groups united around a common objective regardless of class or gender.  However 
unity did not last long and its dissolution in the following years prompted the end of the ‘ten 
years of spring’, when the figure of a common enemy had vanished and political, ideological and 
personal interests once again took priority. The revolutionary government enacted reforms in the 
areas of education, health, labor and land tenure. These reforms gave rise to an oppositional force 
of the conservative sectors who felt threatened by the power that such reforms were giving the 
marginal sector of the population, mainly indigenous, to participate and gain a more powerful 
role in the country.28 The Arévalo and Arbenz governments were not communist, but rather “ a 
serious effort to return people’s dignity by recognizing it.”29 It was an attempt at democracy that 
scared the dominant elites and the United States. Elites were afraid of losing power and status in 
the political and economic spheres of the country, and the United States was afraid of 
communism.30 These sectors could not handle a different viewpoint from their own and were 
quick to perform their role as opposition. The government allowed these groups to air their 
disagreements because to do otherwise would have been undemocratic. The university also 
became fragmented with the Committee of Anticommunist University Students, CEUA, at 
                                                        
28 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004). 
 
29 Guzmán Böckler, “Para rememorar el 20 de octubre de 1944: una reflexión previa y necesaria.”  
 
30 Stephen C Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, 2nd ed., David Rockefeller 
Center series on Latin American studies, Harvard University 4 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, David 
Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2005), 38-42.  At the time the new democratic government took 
power, two percent of the landowners owned 75 percent of the land. 90 percent of the total population only owned 
15 percent of productive land. The country also had a 75 percent illiteracy rate, and life expectancy was only 50 
years for non indigenous and 40 years for the indigenous population. To combat such inequalities the government 
instituted a socials security bill, labor code, emphasis on education and land reform. 
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certain points gaining the leadership of the official social and political bodies of the university, 
the AEU and the Huelga de Dolores, and used them to attack the government.31  
After ten years of a democratically elected government, with the help of a U.S. 
intervention, the opposition in exile as well as the opposition in the country conformed by the 
Catholic Church, landowners, and a large section of the middle classes, were able to consolidate 
and overthrow president Arbenz.32 The 1954 coup marked a watershed in the politics of the 
country and gave way to the period known as the counterrevolution. During this period many of 
the reforms of the revolutionary government were reversed. After taking power in a new Cold 
War climate, the counterrevolutionary government was not so lenient or perhaps so naïve with its 
opposition as the previous government had been.  The government instituted a new Ley Orgánica 
for National Police and placed it under the jurisdiction of a newly created Committee of Security, 
whose official job was to combat communism but expanded its aim to all government 
opposition. This change was important because the revolutionary government had placed 
emphasis not on new legislation for the police but on its ethos. As part of the structural 
counterrevolutionary change, prominent figures from the Ubico dictatorship returned to their 
posts in the police. Bernabé Linares, the director of Ubico’s secret police, returned to head the 
same section of the police under the new government.  
The counterrevolutionary government prided itself in being a democratic movement that 
overthrew a “communist” regime, however, they began deeming all opposition as communists, 
                                                        
31 Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras; José Barnoya García, La Huelga de Dolores (Guatemala: Ediciones 
Calabaza, 1979). The Huelga de Dolores is a student tradition dating back to 1898 started by the law and medicine 
students as a way to air their discontent with government authorities. It consists of a series of events previous to 
Holy Week that parody various actors of society like the government and the Catholic Church. As part of the 
activities, the students read various bulletins making fun and complaining of the particular situation the country at 
the time. The also participate in an evening performance during which they present songs and sketches of social 
issues. Their event culminates with a parade, the Desfile Bufo, where the students march, singing, dancing and 
parodying the government, the church, and various other social actors. 
 
32 Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit; Gleijeses, Esperanza rota. 
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which legally allowed them to repress it. The university associations and students, minus the 
anticommunist groups, would soon experience direct government ordered repression for the first 
time in ten years. The government began to stress in discourse that the enemy was internal and 
external and they would not stop until all communism was eliminated. This gave way to a 
discourse and practice of institutionalized violence, which would come to mark the basis for the 
following decades in which Guatemala succumbed to 36 years of civil war, a conflict so brutal 
that although it ended in 1996, its horrific consequences still affect the everyday lives of most 
Guatemalans.  
 
The Sources Used 
The information related to the University of San Carlos of Guatemala was found in the 
archives located in the Benson Library under the Taracena Flores Collection, which contains an 
immense amount of information of both the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary periods. In 
Guatemala I visited the Centro de Investigación Regional de Mesoamerica, CIRMA, where the 
Taracena Arriola Collection is located. This collection is in part complementary to the one in the 
Benson Library and also holds information on the student movement during the 1950’s.  Located 
in the first floor of the main library of the Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, USAC, the 
archive of the Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios, AEU, was also extremely helpful. The 
documents about the association include correspondence, bulletins, comunicados, and transcripts 
of student sessions. While not complete and not in the best shape due to innumerable police 
searches that the university underwent during the war, the archive nonetheless contains valuable 
information.  
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Close to 90 percent of the media sources analyzed during the historical period are from 
the newspaper El Imparcial. Due to time constraints I decided to analyze the media response to 
these events only through this news source but it is also the most thorough and complete of all 
since it was established in 1922 and stopped circulating in 1985. Therefore I acknowledge that 
the viewpoint of the media I present only comes from this newspaper and does not take into 
consideration other newspapers that also circulated at the time like Prensa Libre, Nuestro Diario, 
and La Hora. Yet many of the citations used from the newspaper come directly from bulletins of 
various sectors, groups and the government published at times in their entirety. There lies the 
importance of this source, since at this point it would be extremely difficult to find original 
statements and manifestos of various groups of the time, it is easier to find them published in the 
paper.  
And most importantly, the Guatemalan National Police Archives provided valuable 
information regarding the National Police. The Police as an institution was established in 1882 
but interest in the force arose after 1996 when two Truth Commissions, one headed by the 
Catholic Church and the other by the United Nations, were established to document the human 
rights violations that took place during the armed conflict. The commissions asked the security 
forces, the army and the police, for any information they had regarding their institutions to 
incorporate it into their reports. Both institutions denied having archives and refused to 
cooperate. No one knew of the existence of records of the National Police until their accidental 
discovery in 2005, by a group of Human Rights officials looking for explosives in an old Police 
warehouse in Guatemala City. The Archive contains information on the police since its creation 
until 1996 when as part of the Peace Accords the institution was restructured. The Police has 
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been an extremely secretive institution, thus the discovery of these records mark the possibility 
of learning more about it and writing about its history.  
The Police Archive is barely in the beginning stages of organization and digitalization, 
since it is estimated that it contains about 80 million documents, many in state of decay. At the 
time of my research, the archives were closed to researchers, but I was allowed access to the 
digitalized information corresponding to my dates of interest.33 The information available 
allowed me insight into the interactions of the police, its agents and superiors as well as the 
relationship with the citizens of Guatemala. The Memoria de Labores, logbooks detailing the 
Police’s yearly activities by day, were especially helpful in revealing the mentality of the police 
in the eras of the revolution and counterrevolution. The language and data presented in these 
logbooks signaled a clear change in the police in terms of its rhetoric during the period of the 
revolution, although I am still not sure to what extent the changes applied to its practice. 
Legislative changes during the counterrevolution also make themselves present in the pages of 
these logbooks. The Libros de Detenciones also provided information on the reason for citizen’s 
arrests as well as the number of arrests made throughout the year. Also helpful were the Fichas 
de Identificación, which served as an index to the files of individuals, who were accused of 
criminal activities or were of interest to the police. The identification department was in charge 
of these documents and they help to demonstrate how the police closely monitored individuals 
and their lives.  
Finally, I was fortunate to be given interviews by several of the participants and 
protagonists of my story. These men were not only university students but were also student 
                                                        
33 On March 2009, the Police Archives were open to the public (only information from 1975 to 1985) during an act 
that included the presentation of the first report regarding the archives. The day after the report was presented and 
the archives open, the wife of the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman was kidnapped and tortured. She was 
later released, but this shows how difficult it still is to make this kind of information public and how inquiring about 
institutions like the police, continues to be problematic and a source of danger in Guatemala.  
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leaders. They participated in one or several of the university associations discussed in my work, 
like the AEU, the Comité de Huelga de Dolores, the Asociación El Derecho, Frente Universitario 
Democrático, FUD, and the Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas, CEUA/ 
CEUAGE. Roberto Diaz Castillo was a member of the FUD, and president of the AEU at the 
time of the coup against Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Carlos Guzmán Böckler, through his college 
career served as president of El Derecho, was a member of the AEU and also of the Comité de 
Huelga de Dolores. José Barnoya descends from a long and strong tradition of huelgueros and 
was very much involved in the Comité de Huelga de Dolores during both the revolution and the 
first part of the counterrevolution. Leonel Sisniega Otero was one of the founders of the CEUA, 
which would later become Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas Guatemaltecos 
en el Exilio, CEUAGE, which stood as a block of student opposition against the revolutionary 
government internally and abroad. All four with their unique outlooks, ideologies and memories 
provided me with valuable information and not only allowed but prompted me look at the events 













Los “Atentados Dinamiteros” de 1952: Student Fragmentation, Solidarity and the 
Response of the Revolutionary Government 
 
 
Me parece una injusticia estar preso señor juez, 
Por tirarle una pedrada al presidente 
Se muy bien que en puntería nunca me he sacado un diez, 
Y el objetivo no era darle a ese teniente 
Me parece una injusticia estar preso señor juez, 
Y ni siquiera haberle dado a mi objetivo...                
- Ricardo Arjona, Señor Juez34 
 
 
As the years passed after the events of 1944, the population no longer had the figure of a 
common enemy capable of uniting all the different sectors of society. As a result, the various 
groups dispersed, each in search of their own ideological, personal, political, social, or economic 
interests. Some of the right-wing groups turned to illegal actions to try to depose the government 
they perceived communist because of the social and economic reforms it was enacting. This was 
the case with a group of anticommunist students who in 1952 planned a series of sabotage 
attacks in an effort to destabilize the government and prompt an insurrection that would depose 
president Arbenz.  
The group’s actions were unsuccessful, and the National Police quickly acted and 
arrested some of its members. Some of the students detained, soon accused the police of torture. 
Therefore, this event provides a closer view of the interaction between the police as an institution 
of a democratic government, and the student movement, an important part of the society of the 
time. This chapter will also analyze the interactions and solidarity of university associations 
given the growing ideological differences among them. It will also focus on the role and 
                                                        
34 Ricardo Arjona, Santo Pecado, Audio CD (Sony International, 2002). 
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transformation of the National Police during the revolutionary government. The transformation 
of the police is important because, “how the police plays its changing role during 
democratization has an enormous influence on levels of social order, the rule of law, and 
corruption and helps determine the practical content of political rights.”35 Thus structural 
changes along with an emphasis on behavior are vital in making the state bureaucratic apparatus 
“usable” to the new democratic government leaders and in allowing them “to exercise effectively 
[their] claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory.”36 However, by 
arguing that the revolutionary government placed greater emphasis on the rhetoric and attitudes 
of the newly formed police rather than on the legislation to reform it, I show that this lack of 
structural change allowed the opposition groups to manipulate the image of the police, 
associating it with the memory of repression of the Ubico dictatorship, something the revolution 
had sought to eliminate.  
 
The Background 
The university and its associations exemplified the growing fragmentation in Guatemala. 
The newly acquired university autonomy of 1944 presented students with freedoms never before 
experienced. For the first time the student body was able to actively participate in the election of 
their student authorities and in the decision making process of their university. The definition of 
freedom for the students not only meant the possibility to rule their university for the first time, 
but also their ability to openly criticize the government without an innate fear of repression as 
had been the case during the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. The spaces provided by the University 
                                                        
35 Murray Scot Tanner, “Review: Will the State Bring You Back In? Policing and Democratization,” Comparative 
Politics 33, no. 1 (October 2000): 101-124. 
 
36 Ibid: 102-103. 
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Student’s Association, AEU, and the Huelga de Dolores, and the many other student 
organizations, allowed students to gather around a particular group or association while 
maintaining, protecting and developing their own political ideologies.  
By the 1950’s different factions were willing to pursue their own ideological interests for 
what they believed would be the best not only for the university but for the country as well. The 
emergence and influx of different ideals and opinions within the university was also largely 
influenced by the growth the student body during the revolutionary period. By 1954 the 
university had 3368 students compared to 1809 students in 1947 and the 611 in 1928.37 The 
student growth can be attributed to various factors, one being Juan José Arévalo’s emphasis on 
education, which led to the creation of new departments and university faculties as well as an 
increase in educational spending.38 These educational reforms along with a recuperating 
economy, by 1947 coffee prices were the same as before the depression, allowed a larger section 
of the middle classes to send their children to college. Finally, the end of the restrictions and 
quotas that prevented access to education during the past dictatorship facilitated admission to the 
university.39  
Gradually, university students began to fragment among conservative anticommunist 
students organized in the CEUA, and those who might not have fully supported the government 
but were more open minded toward the revolutionary regime, like the AEU, El Derecho and 
                                                        
37 Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras, 297. 
 
38 It is important to note that while a lot of emphasis was placed on education, it still benefitted the urban areas 
rather than the rural ones. Illiteracy rates and lack of educational centers was such that the census of 1950 concluded 
that 89.2 percent of indigenous school age children did not attend school, and 90.3 percent of the indigenous 
population was illiterate. To counteract this situation in the 1945 constitution the government created the Comité 
Nacional de Alfabetización, by 1950 they had reached 82,278 people. At the same time the revolutionary period 
witnessed the greatest growth in educational spending in the history of the country. The budget for education in 
1944 was Q.1, 330,000, by 1954 it had expanded to Q.10, 735,572.50 
 
39 Carlos González Orellana, Historia de la educación en Guatemala, Colección Historia nuestra v. no. 1 (Ciudad 
Universitaria, Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1980). 
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other smaller student associations. While the death of Colonel Francisco Arana in 1949 was a 
blow to the conservative sector, destroying their hope of having him replace Arévalo in the next 
presidential election, it also served as a justification to direct greater anger at the revolutionary 
government, blaming it for his death and to exacerbate the division among the students.40 The 
following year, the death of college student Edgar Lemcke on June 19, 1950, during a 
confrontation between anti and pro government supporters was also a source of conflict for 
students.41 The anticommunists turned Lemcke’s death into a symbol of their struggle against 
what they believed was an oppressive communist government that killed any opposition. While 
his death according to some was accidental and while accounts place Lemcke’s ideology as 
center-left rather than right wing, to this day conservative sectors refer Lemcke as a martyr.42  
In this power struggle of ideologies within the university, the Comité de Estudiantes 
Universitarios Anticomunistas, CEUA, was by far the most conservative group and the most 
opposed to the government. Their statements, actions, and accusations against the government 
would not cease until 1954, when the government was overthrown. The group developed into a 
strong oppositional force while its members were in exile, by participating in the propaganda 
campaign against Arbenz and its government as well as by making contact with other 
                                                        
40 Francisco Javier Arana was one of the military officers who participated in the invasion of the Guardia de Honor 
on October 20th 1944. Arana served as the Chief of the Armed forces and was very sympathetic to the conservative 
sectors and to the United States. In 1949 president Arévalo learned that Arana was planning a coup against him and 
instructed officers to arrest him. However, during his arrest shots were fired and he was killed.  
 
41 Edgar Lemcke was a law student and was killed on July 20, 1950, during the first ‘Minuto de Silencio’. The 
Minuto de Silencio, or Minute of Silence was a practice started by Manuel Cobos Batres as a way to protest the 
government. Cobos Batres would stand in silence for one minute in downtown Guatemala with supporters, however 
that day, the anticommunists were met by a group of government supporters. Soon both groups began attacking each 
other, and among the commotion, Edgar Lemcke was stabbed. José Barnoya was present and recalled that before 
dying Lemcke yelled: “viva Arévalo”, “long live Arévalo”, prompting an anticommunist student to reply: “Me 
alegra que te hayan rompido la trompa,” “I’m glad they fucked you up.”. Nonetheless, after his death the 
anticommunists paraded his coffin through downtown taking advantage of his death to attack the government.  
 
42 Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras., 255; “Entrevista José Barnoya,” Interview by Maria Aguilar, Oral 
Interview, August 2008; “Entrevista Leonel Sisniega Otero,”  interview by Maria Aguilar, Oral Interview, 
December 2008. 
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disenchanted sectors including members of the military and eventually the CIA.  However, the 
events that prompted the members of the CEUA to leave the country were the ‘atentados 
dinamiteros’ of 1952 and their aftermath. These events also provided the group with an 
opportunity not only to radicalize their view against the government but also to criticize it with 
the support from other sectors of society including other student associations, which might not 
have shared their conservative ideology but believed that violations against students or any 
individual called for the solidarity of the entire student body.  
 
Los Atentados 
On Monday June 9th 1952, Guatemalan newspapers reported that on the night of Saturday 
June 7th and June 8th, two explosions occurred in an electric tower and transformer located in the 
outskirts of Guatemala City. The damage was minimal since many of the dynamite sticks did not 
explode, but within days the police had apprehended as suspects various members of the CEUA. 
Based on declarations from eyewitnesses, confessions of two of the alleged participants, and on 
explosives found in one of the suspect’s residence, the police pressed charges against the 
students for public disorder and for illegal possession of explosives.43  
 According to the confession of one of the detainees, the events were to be part of a 
network of attacks planned to destabilize and overthrow the government. After the incident, the 
Ministro de Gobernación, Minister of the Interior, Ricardo Chávez Nackmann presented the 
official police report containing the names of the suspects all of who belonged to the CEUA.44 
                                                        
43 “Atentados Dinamiteros al Alumbrado Eléctrico en la Ciudad: Uno el Sábado y Otro esta Mañana,” El Imparcial, 
June 9, 1952; “De Haber Culminado el Acto de Sabotaje,” El Imparcial, June 10, 1952; “Tres Estudiantes 
Anticomunistas Detenidos en Forma Ilegal,” El Imparcial, June 16, 1952; “Dinamita Incautada en un Chalet, Hoy,” 
El Imparcial, June 21, 1952. 
 
44 “Trama del Complot,” El Imparcial, July 2, 1952. The following are the names of the accused, however only the 
first five are actually arrested: Roberto Fernández Castellanos, Mario Quiñonez, Edgar Salvador Quiñonez, 
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Given that the accused were university students, the CEUA appealed to the AEU to help them 
pressure the government to release the students in custody. The CEUA accused the government 
of conducting unlawful arrests and house searches against its members. One week after the 
arrests, two of the detainees accused the police of torturing them to extract confessions. These 
accusations placed a stress on the government and security forces who were quickly pressured by 
the AEU and other students to not only release the students but at the same time to direct an 
investigation against the Ministro and the police forces for the accusation of torture.  
 
The CEUA 
The Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas, CEUA, was a group formed 
by university students beginning in 1950 shortly after the death of Colonel Francisco Javier 
Arana. The group started to become disenchanted with some policies of the fist revolutionary 
president, Juan José Arévalo, but their opposition to the government grew stronger when 
President Jacobo Arbenz began discussing the agrarian reform. This group of students perceived 
President Arbenz as a communist who wanted to turn Guatemala into a country dominated by 
Soviets.45 
Leonel Sisniega Otero, the last remaining member of the CEUA, explained the formation 
of the committee.46 Despite his initial support of Juan José Arévalo, he quickly felt that outsiders 
were “giving ‘meaning’ to the revolution, [and] their arguments clashed with our principles and 
                                                        
Alejandro Castro, Luis Mendizábal, Mario López, Eduardo Taracena, Chato Lurze, Horacio Paredes, Lionel 
Sisniega Otero, Domingo Gloicolea.  
 
45 Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas (Guatemala), El calvario de Guatemala (Guatemala, 1955). 
Also, their opinions were stated in all of their public statements in which they accused the government of supporting 
and being infiltrated with communists.  
 
46 “Entrevista Leonel Sisniega Otero.”  
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values.”47 After that, according to Sisniega Otero, he and others with similar ideals approached 
“the true author of the revolution,” Javier Arana, and asked him to be their leader. Sisniega Otero 
described how he felt excluded from the law student association, El Derecho, which he viewed 
as extreme leftists. Instead, in 1947 he joined with others to form the Comité de Estudiantes 
Universitarios Anticomunistas to counteract the weight of the leftist university associations. 
Nonetheless, the group appeared to be unsure of what represented the left or what represented 
communism, they used “the left” and “communism” as umbrella terms to group all mindsets 
opposite to their own. The CEUA “was a right formed by a multitude of different attitudes, there 
was no program, no goal, no philosophy, simply everyone who was against the left was deemed 
right, so that is why we were of the right.”48 What the CEUA wanted was to move all sectors of 
the population “up”, a very vague goal. According to them, the government “wanted equality for 
all, we wanted the harmony of all, they wanted to bring everybody down, we wanted to lift up 
those who were down.” 49  Clearly there was no specific goal nor did they provide alternatives 
when criticizing government reforms.  
The committee’s first main public statement was published on May 5th, 1952, in El 
Imparcial. In it, the CEUA delivered “an authentic declaration of war against the government.”50  
They protested the communist infiltration in the country, and listed several articles of the 
Constitution that they believed were being violated by having members of the Partido 
Guatemalteco del Trabajo, the Guatemalan communist party, in government posts. They also 
                                                        
47 Ibid. Sisniega Otero made clear in his interview that the opposed the labor code and land reform, which he 




49 Ibid.  
 
50 Jesús García Añoveros, “El "caso Guatemala" (junio 1954): La universidad y el campesinado,” Alero, February 
1978, 160.  
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argued that the government was not adhering to the Constitution, and therefore failing to do its 
job.51 At the same time they called on the population to assemble and march on June 1st to 
repudiate the communist control in the government. Three days before the march, on May 29th, 
the CEUA issued another statement accusing the government of “distributing weapons to the 
working masses,” therefore due to a “lack of security for the Guatemalan people,” they were 
cancelling the march.52   
At the beginning the committee’s members were university students, and slowly they 
began branching out to other non-students groups and reached other areas of society. The first 
step was the connection the group made with the women shopkeepers of the Mercado Central, 
the main market in Guatemala City, many of whom were originally from the surrounding towns 
of the capital. Their ties to rural areas allowed the group to connect with other people and begin 
branching out beyond the university.53 While the group itself claimed to have a large following, 
others disagree and claim that within the university they were not very well received by the other 
student associations and groups. José Barnoya referred to them as the “Choleros de Estados 
Unidos de America, CEUA.”54 He also said, “they were very few, one could count them with the 
fingers, they were all monkeys.”55 Guzmán Böckler had stronger words to describe them,  
If I say they were 20 I’m overestimating, […] I’m even exceeding if I compare them to 
those here [Guatemala] who support the antichrist, no one paid any attention to them, 
they were the laughingstock of everybody, even in the Huelga we made fun of them 
because they would protest in the Sexta Avenida. Give me a Break! At six o’clock and 
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52 Directiva del Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas, “Pueblo de Guatemala,” May 29, 1952, 
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they wore a red ribbon, they were full of shit, we even composed them a song: with a red 
ribbon on their arm they go to the Sexta monton de culecos.56 
 
At the time of the attempted bombing on June 1952, the CEUA denied the charges 
against them. Instead they accused the government of carrying out a repressive campaign to 
destroy the opposition. They also declared that they would resist arrest and that any violence 
resulting from their captures should be blamed on the security forces.57 In 2008, Sisniega Otero 
discussed the Atentados Dinamiteros and accepted that they were part of a plan to destabilize the 
government, something that in 1952 he denied. He explained that cutting the electric power to 
the city would serve as a signal to military officers in Fort Matamoros to rebel and provide arms 
for the opposition to overthrow the government. He claimed not to have been present and that it 
was not until his return to the capital that he learned of the failed attempt.58  
 
The University’s Official Response  
The AEU as the official voice of the university decided to support the CEUA and issued 
statements asking for the fair and just treatment of the students arrested. At the same time in an 
official set of sessions, culminating in a general student assembly, the AEU along with the 
student body discussed strategies. They decided to intervene with the government not necessarily 
on the behalf of the CEUA, but on behalf of the detainees, who were university students. The 
official transcripts of the sessions illustrate the internal debate among the students regarding how 
to proceed with the detainees and with the government. An issue of concern among the members 
                                                        
56 “Entrevista Carlos Guzmán Böckler.” During the days surrounding the bombings, El Imparcial reported that the 
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of the AEU was the fact that one of the detainees was not a university student. Some students 
began questioning whether it was their responsibility to also provide support to this person.  
However, the AEU concluded that abuses and illegalities committed against any individual 
whether or not he was a student damaged the constitutionality and democracy of the country, this 
reasoning also applied to the support the AEU provided the CEUA despite their ideological 
differences. Another resolution from the meetings was the economic support that the AEU 
decided to provide to the families of the detainees to help with food and jail bond expenses. At 
the same time the members of the AEU created an internal commission in charge of investigating 
the torture accusations.59  
In the student assembly, were also present members of the CEUA, Leonel Sisniega Otero 
spoke in representation of the Committee, and accused the government of planning the bombings 
as a pretext to arrest members of the opposition. Jorge E. Rosal president of the AEU, quickly 
and clearly stressed that the AEU’s participation related exclusively to the students and the 
university, and that they would not serve the sectarian, political or class interests of the CEUA.60 
In fact, the term “apolitical” is repeated throughout all the press statements release by student 
associations who presented their solidarity to the students arrested. This has to do in part with a 
type of protection that the university associations used against possible attacks or claims that 
their actions were biased or served political interests. However in this occasion, the term 
apolitical was mostly stressed because the rest of university association did not agree with the 
ideology or practices of the CEUA. At the end of the assembly, the AEU drafted a resolution 
                                                        
59 “Sesión Directiva de AEU,” June 17, 1952, Correspondencia 52,55,57,60,62 Non.1 Tercera Transferencia, 
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protesting illegal detentions, torture, and the violation of constitutional rights. At the same time 
they asked for the liberation of the detainees and called on the authorities to investigate the 
torture and hold someone accountable for such violations. As part of their resolution, the AEU 
decided to organize a peaceful march at the end of which, they would deliver a petition asking 
for the resignation of the Ministro de Gobernación Chávez Nackmann.61 
 
Police and Government Response 
If successful, the sabotage acts of June 7th and 8th, would have represented substantial 
economic damage to the country. According to the electric company the destruction of the tower 
and transformer would have left Guatemala City and surrounding areas without electricity for at 
least 18 months.62 Yet these actions also represented a blatant disregard for democratic 
institutions since their aim was to depose a government that had been democratically and freely 
elected. Nonetheless, the administration simply urged the population to remain calm. The only 
urgent security measure was added vigilance to other important electric towers of the country.63 
The government did not go on a media campaign against the opposition, nor did it question the 
constitutional guarantees of the population.  
During this time, the administration made attempts to advance on the sabotage case while 
at the same time investigating the alleged police abuses, but the president distanced himself from 
the events. The Ministro de Gobernación Chávez Nackmann was placed in charge of the 
investigation against the students and of inquiring about the torture allegations. Nevertheless, 








the police. In protest organized by the AEU, several students held signs that read “to torture is 
not democracy, Jacobo your officials are screwing up.”64 Due to the severity of the accusations 
against the authorities, Chávez Nackmann decided to meet with two leaders of the CEUA, Mario 
Sandoval Alarcón and Leonel Sisniega Otero.  According to El Imparcial, which reported on the 
exchange, the students made the same accusations and the Minister responded by listing several 
protests organized by their committee for which they had no authorization and where the police 
was not sent to arrest them, despite the fact that they were breaking the law.  
Nackmann also reminded Sandoval Alarcón and Sisniega Otero that several of their 
marches ended up outside his window with members of their group screaming accusations at 
him; therefore if the government or himself were on a rampage to get rid of the opposition they 
would have had enough motives and opportunities within the law to have done so. He also 
mentioned that it was well known to the authorities that members of the CEUA were traveling to 
various areas of the countryside criticizing the government and the agrarian reform law, which 
was about to be passed by congress. To this, Leonel Sisniega responded that the “populace had 
the liberty to gather freely and express their opinions and to say to their authorities whatever they 
wished.”65 Sisniega Otero claimed he said much more to the Ministro that day, “I told him, tell 
me where are we putting these bombs? Because if I am going to place a bomb I would put it 
under your chair not on the street.”66 These retorts exemplify one of the group’s contradictions. 
While the CEUA claimed the government was communist and constantly complained about its 
attempt to silence them, it was able to make defiant and disrespectful comments such as these. 
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The fact that they were able to express like that in public, in front of government officials, 
without repercussion, is an example of the freedoms provided by the democratic government.  
 
The Laws in Effect, a Reformed Police Force? 
In October 1944, after the tripartite junta took power, the police force was disbanded and 
replaced by a temporary Civic Guard, made up of university students and Boy Scouts, many still 
underage.67 The Civic Guard was highly regarded by people from all over the country, who 
quickly sent economic and food donations to the students. The volunteers served until the police 
was once again reinstated with members who it was believed did not participate in the past 
violations and by those who answered a public calling for new agents.68  In his first report to the 
executive, the new director of the police wrote:  
I proceeded with strength and energy to organize, as the circumstances demanded it, the 
various services of the new Civil Guard. Especial attention was placed on selecting, 
among the aspiring officers, individuals that due to their good physical condition, moral 
record and behavior, deserved to be considered as part of this institution. Of the 
individuals who served in the old National Police, very few were allowed to be part of the 
Civil Guard after making sure they had a clean record.69 
 
However, an interesting and perhaps overlooked fact is that the government did not 
reform the Ley Orgánica of the Police except for the change of name.70 The name of the two 
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police branches, Policía Judicial and Policía Nacional were changed to the Guardia Judicial and 
Guardia Civil. Under the Arbenz government, the director of the Guardia Civil was Colonel 
Rogelio Cruz Wer, who took on the post of director on May 1952 and served until June 28, 
1954.71 His defense of the Guatemalan communist party made him an enemy for the CEUA as 
well as other anticommunist groups.72  
During the Ubico regime, the Guardia Judicial was better known as the secret police and 
was headed by Bernabé Linares, who would return to this post during the counterrevolution. 
Nonetheless, this section of law enforcement was in charge of investigating criminal activity, but 
its procedural codes were and are to this date not clear. This section of the police was first 
mentioned in decrees of 1924 as a section that would aid the national police in its investigations. 
The judicial police were also mentioned in a Decree No. 8 of the Revolutionary Junta of 1944 as 
a body that will aid the Jueces de Paz in criminal diligences.73 The junta also stated that the 
judiciales were under the command of the Office of Identification of the National Police.74  
The fact that the government, democratic, the first of its kind, decided not to reform the 
police procedural code is interesting and raises many questions. Was their decision based on the 
fact that they believed Ubico’s code was suitable for the new regime? Shouldn’t a democratic 
government trying to adhere to a rule of law, moving away from the known brutalities of the past 
committed by the police, want to reform and democratize the force by providing it with a new 
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code? The Memoria de Labores of the police, which listed their everyday events, point to the fact 
that the government was more concerned with reforming the individuals inside the police than 
the laws themselves.75 The Memorias display how the directors and heads of stations focused 
more on how well the existing laws were respected and implemented and on the behaviors and 
attitudes of their agents. It appears that for the government, the change of name would also 
represent a change of behavior and a shift of how the police approached its duties. This was 
expressed in the Memorias of 1944, which noted: “the Civil Guard was established, substituting 
the former National Police, thus satisfying one of the just aspirations of the people who expect 
that in the new guards of public order, prevails a true sense of justice and respect to citizen 
rights.”76 
The Memoria de Labores of the National Police portray a deep sense of pride from the 
officers to serve under a democratic regime. The language used towards the officers also 
demonstrated an emphasis on exhorting officers to excel in their jobs. At the beginning of 1951 
the report delivered by the Guardia Judicial, began by congratulating all the officers for their 
work, which “satisfies the aspirations of the people and of the genuine democratic government of 
this nation.”77 Officers were ordered to always be on time, attentive, disciplined, orderly, 
respectful, and efficient, since police misbehavior would only “violate the revolution and harm 
its prestige.”78 
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At the same time the Memorias provide useful information about the interactions between 
the officers. How the police behaved within its sections and its internal rules can help determine 
what their attitude towards the public was. The Memorias from the time of Arbenz reveal a 
police force very focused on presenting to the public a reformed and respectful institution that 
should lead by example. According to the director of the police, agents should be “true 
exponents of civism and culture, so that in the future they constitute a positive guarantee for all 
citizens.”79 The logbooks of the police are filled with memos from the police chiefs directing 
their subordinates to take note of certain behavior rules as to provide a good example for the 
population. These orders were not an official part of the police code but more like unofficial 
rules enacted as superiors deemed necessary. They were also not presented as orders but as 
reminders or suggestions, such as: the personnel are reminded that…, the personnel are warned 
that…, or I have observed certain attitudes and in order to avoid them…. Officers were forbidden 
and would be reprimanded and punished for matters such as smoking, spitting, flirting, and being 
disrespectful to civilians or their superiors, failure to look presentable, among many other non-
appropriate police behavior. According to the police director such actions “display a lack of 
culture and education, which should exist in a good servant of the institution.”80  
At the same time the reasons that officers received bajas or punishments are important 
because they show the police was not perfect or very professional. The biggest cause of officer’s 
misbehavior was drunkenness. There are countless cases documented of officers failing to attend 
work or abandoning their posts due to their inebriated state. Another indicator of the lack of 
professionalization of the police and some of its internal problems was the fact that on certain 
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occasions officers were fired when it was discovered they were illiterate. That shows that the 
police as an institution was in need of better recruitment, training and salaries. For the most part 
the Memoria de Labores does not present a violent police but instead an institution with 
problems, but also in a position to serve as an example for the population in the new democratic 
era.  
This is not say that the government did not take any type of action against the opposition. 
One police logbook dating from 1952 to 1954 contained several descriptions of arrests, and 
while it did not mention the Atentados Dinamiteros, it did list captures for actions against the 
government. The book included details of arrests of individuals for attacks against police officers 
and disrespect for the government. Other repetitive causes for arrest were: proposal of rebellion, 
crime of rebellion, sedition, and supplying subversive propaganda. It also made mention of 
arrests due to explosives found in a journalist’s home, and mentioned the expulsion of disliked 
foreigners.81 In 1951 when social unrest led President Arbenz to cancel constitutional guarantees 
and implement martial law, the police was instructed to monitor meetings carried out without 
permits.82 They were also ordered to prevent public protests and to question individuals 
suspected of carrying weapons but without committing any type of abuses. Officers were 
prompted to continue showing “signs of fidelity towards the Institution to which they have the 
honor of belonging; exhorting them at the same time to continue providing service in a noble 
manner as honest citizens at the service of the fatherland.”83 Throughout the Memorias, there 
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was no mention of officers being reprimanded for abusing or torturing criminals or members of 
the opposition. However, it is understandable that if violations did occur it is most likely that 
they would not be recorded to avoid culpability.  
A final discovery of the inner workings of the police is the fact that there was a level of 
enmity between the police and the army. There is no mention of both forces working together. 
Moreover, memos warned the police to avoid interaction with the army and avoid going to their 
quarters. All this to try an maintain a “certain level of harmony between both groups.” Several 
months later, referring to the previous statement another warning was issued to the police asking 
to avoid interference with the armed forces and to limit communication. Such changes “will 
avoid continuing and dangerous frictions with elements of that Armed Institution, with whom 
one should be understanding, approachable, and mutually helpful.”84 
 
Police Procedures: Arrests, Warrants, the Investigation and Torture Claims  
The government issued a total of ten arrests warrants against members of the CEUA for 
their participation in the sabotage acts. Out of the ten only five people were arrested but two 
were quickly freed after the authorities failed to gather enough evidence against them, but mainly 
because both individuals were able to provide credible alibis. Therefore the accusations were 
mainly directed against three individuals, Mario Quiñonez, his brother Edgar Salvador Quiñonez 
and Roberto Fernandez Castellanos. While both the Quiñonez brothers accused the police of 
torture, Mario is the one who described his torture in full detail. He narrated how he was 
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drenched in cold water, shocked with electricity, hit on the soles of his feet, and penetrated in the 
anus with a metal object.85 His brother’s accusation was not specific about the torture undergone 
and during a medical inspection only Mario presented some bruises, which could have 
constituted possible signs of torture.86 
Parts of the evidence for the case against the students were the declarations provided by 
Roberto Fernandez and Edgar Quiñonez accepting their culpability. However, Quiñonez quickly 
retracted his declaration and claimed it was given because he was tortured. Aside from these 
declarations the police had two eyewitnesses who were in the area, a fisherman and the guardian 
of the electric towers who described the cars and the individuals who attacked the tower.87 
Finally the police confiscated dynamite from a residence that Mario Quiñonez and Mario López, 
another anticommunist member, rented in Colonia Mariscal, a neighborhood in Guatemala City. 
The charges against the students began as public disorder but once the dynamite was found and 
tied to the accused, the charges escalated to illegal possession of explosives, an offense 
punishable by the death penalty.  
On June 19th, the press was invited to the office of the Director of the Police Colonel 
Rogelio Cruz Wer to interview some of the detainees, among them the Quiñonez brothers. 
According to the Ministro de Gobernación, the government was not targeting students or 
anticommunists, but simply trying to find the responsible for the sabotage attacks that could have 
had disastrous consequences for the city. Present during the interview were the police director, 
the Ministro and a judge. The engineering student Roberto Fernandez Castellanos was the first 
interviewed. He sustained his past declaration that he had not been tortured, and that he had 
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participated in the sabotage act of the electric towers. He claimed his role in the events was that 
of a driver for the rest of the individuals who would carry out the acts. Fernandez Castellanos 
argued he had denied his involvement at first, but when Edgar Quiñonez confessed and began 
giving names of other participants he decided to confess as well.  
In his declaration, Edgar Quiñonez, who was not a student but a merchant, denied any 
participation or membership in political groups or associations. Edgar argued his previous 
confession where he had accepted participation in the events was given by mistake since at the 
time he felt intimidated. His brother Mario Quiñonez, a law student, said his declaration was not 
forced. His answers coincided with his previous declaration, where he denied any participation in 
sabotage tactics.88 That same day, Luis Mendizábal another student member of the CEUA was 
released after five days of imprisonment for lack of evidence against him. After his release the 
student claimed he had been “severely tortured”.  He stated his torture resembled the one 
underwent by the Quiñonez brothers but in addition he had suffered cold baths in the pila of the 
prison and twisting of his feet and that while tortured, he always denied his participation in any 
disorderly acts.89 
On June 20th the paper reported that Roberto Fernandez, Edgar and Mario Quiñonez 
would be freed that afternoon after the courts set their bail at Q400 each. At the same time that 
same day the courts began a process to investigate the accusations of torture.90 The same day the 
newspaper reported that two students who their families said were arrested by the Guardia 
Judicial were not presented to their families. The police argued that the students could not be 
found in any of the detention centers, while the families claimed the two students were being 
                                                        
88 “Periodistas interrogan a sindicados,” El Imparcial, June 19, 1952. 
 
89 “Dos estudiantes no fueron exhibidos en la Guardia Civil; se ignora paradero,” El Imparcial, June 19, 1952. 
 
90 “Tres estudiantes por salir libres Hoy; Investigación sobre las torturas, abren,” El Imparcial, June 20, 1952. 
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tortured. The following day the Police Director provided a statement in the form of a letter to El 
Imparcial where he explained the whereabouts of the two students and gave other declarations on 
behalf of the Civil Guard. In his letter Cruz Wer stated that according to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs the two students sought asylum in the Honduran embassy but he did not know why, 
given that there were no warrants or investigations against them. He also added the reason other 
students and individuals were been apprehended was the result of an investigation that pointed to 
them as the responsible for the attacks to the electric towers. The Police Director also stated that 
all accusations of torture on the part of the CEUA were false and merely a tactic to discredit him 
and his security force. He claimed that under his leadership the Guardia Civil “had maintained 
the respect the citizenship deserves without incurring in any type of abuses.” 91  
The Quiñonez brothers were not freed immediately, due to a lack of resources on the part 
of their family, who could not afford both bails. It took their family five days to gather the 
money according to newspaper reports. Yet within those days the police discovered new 
evidence that would incriminate all of the accused in the events and would turn the charges 
against them from public disorder to illegal possession of explosives, a crime punishable by 
death according to decree 1581 passed during the past dictatorship of Jorge Ubico.92  According 
to the authorities, 50 pounds of dynamite were found in a chalet in Colonia Mariscal, the same 
neighborhood where Fernandez Castellanos declared he and the other participants gathered the 
night of the sabotage acts.93  On June 24, just as Mario and Edgar Quiñonez were about to be 
released, the owner of the chalet testified that she had leased the property to Mario Quiñonez on 
                                                        
91 “Declaraciones de la Guardia Civil,” El Imparcial, June 20, 1952.  
 
92 “Dueña del Chalet y Quienes Alquilan,” El Imparcial, June 24, 1952. Jorge Ubico passed Decree 1581, which 
applied the death penalty to the crime of illegal possession of explosives. The legislative decree 299 would have 
modified it but Juan José Arevalo vetoed it during his administration.  
 
93 “Dinamita incautada en un Chalet, hoy.” 
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the first days of the month. Due to the new evidence, a judge ordered the charges against all of 
the accused be modified to illegal possession of explosives, a more serious crime than public 
disorder. The judge also ordered the recapture of the students who had previously made bail and 
were already free, which included Fernandez Castellanos.  Nevertheless, by July all three 
individuals held in custody posted bail. Once free, Roberto Fernandez Castellanos changed his 
story, he denied all of his previous declarations and claimed the only reason he made them was 
due to the abuses his friends were undergoing. Despite this the charges against them were upheld 
due to the remaining evidence in the hands of the police.  
The archives of the university and the newspapers were unable to provide more 
information about the special commission created by the AEU to investigate the abuses. The 
police documents showed no evidence that the police tortured the students, although the archives 
contain millions of documents yet to be reviewed. In the Fichas de Identificación, I was able to 
find the ones corresponding to several members of the CEUA. Individuals like Sisniega Otero, 
Eduardo Taracena de la Cerna, Eduardo Quiñonez, Luis Mendizabal, and Gabriel Martinez del 
Rosal who belonged to the CEUA. In their fichas, they were not described as anticommunists, 
and only a couple had annotations associating them to the Atentados Dinamiteros. Ironically, it 
was not until the counterrevolutionary government took power that several of these individuals 
mentioned began to be closely monitored by the State.94  
Mario Sandoval Alarcón was an example of individuals whose extensive monitoring 
began after the revolution. Sandoval Alarcón was one of the leaders of the CEUA and was 
arrested in 1953 on charges of rebellion. After the coup against Arbenz he was released, and 
served as personal secretary to the president Carlos Castillo Armas. Sandoval’s ficha began in 
                                                        
94 “Ficha Domingo Goicolea Villacorta,” Fondo 50 Caja 58A94.7(35) Legajo 2 Doc 202515, Archivo Histórico de la 
Policía Nacional de Guatemala.; “Ficha Gabriel Martinez del Rosal,” Fondo 50 Caja 58A97.5 Legajo 5 Doc 290451, 
Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional de Guatemala. 
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1946 when it recorded that he was the victim of a robbery. In 1953 his arrest was mentioned but 
that was the only notation due to political reasons during the revolutionary period. In 1957 his 
ficha listed that he accused people of being communists and in 1958 that he was planning the 
assassination of Miguel Idígoras Fuentes and participated in an oppositional movement against 
the government.95 From that year on up until 1986 when the last annotation was made, it is clear 
that all the governments in place closely monitored him.96  
As part of my research I was able to interview individuals who belonged to university 
student organizations during the period of my study. Several of the questions revolved around 
the role of the National Police and whether they believed the accusations of torture were genuine. 
Leonel Sisniega, the last living members of the CEUA continues to stand by the accusations of 
torture and abuses of the police.97 The other three individuals were members of various 
university associations, El Derecho, Comité de Huelga and the AEU.98 All three denied ever 
believing that the police tortured, they claimed to have had an amicable relationship with the 
police at the time. Roberto Diaz Castillo, the president of the AEU at the time of the coup against 
Arbenz said: “they were not tortured, if they had been they would have been dead; instead they 
came back to hold positions of power in the next government.”99 José Barnoya belonged to the 
Comité de Huelga de Dolores, which every year of the revolutionary government mocked the 
                                                        
95 Idígoras Fuentes was president after Castillo Armas was murdered in 1957. 
 
96 “Ficha Mario Sandoval Alarcón,” Fondo 50 Caja 500398 Legajo 1 Ficha No.5 Doc 1528927; Ficha No.6 Doc 
1528929; Ficha No.7 Doc 1528933; Ficha No.8 Doc 1528931, Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional de 
Guatemala. 
 
97 Sisniega Otero claimed the police carried out horrible tortures. According to him, the police cut people’s fingers 
and carried out mass executions. However, for him the police in the time of Ubico were very respectful, he stressed 
that Ubico’s secret police did what it was expected from them, maintain order.  
 
98 El Derecho was the law student’s association; the Comité de Huelga was in charge of the events of the Huelga de 
Dolores. 
 
99 “Entrevista Roberto Díaz Castillo,” Interview by Maria Aguilar, Oral Interview, July 2008. 
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president and its administration. Barnoya agreed that it was possible that the police might have 
been violent if provoked, he said “the police was about giving blows but never about torture 
against those of us who did open and not conspiratorial opposition”, torture to him seemed 
unlikely.100  
Similarly, Carlos Guzmán Böckler a member of El Derecho, when asked about the 
accusations of torture laughed and replied “the Quiñonez brothers who claimed they were 
tortured, everyone said they had brought that electric thing, the electric pipe they called it here, 
and that the little brothers had liked it.”101 This statement was part of the jokes the students made 
about the CEUA and their torture allegations. However on a more serious note he added “we saw 
many things because we were in close contact with the police, and the type of violence that they 
claimed, I would put it in quotation marks, in parenthesis, because one realizes many things and 
after so many years I wouldn’t have a reason to cover for anyone.”102 Torture seemed very 
unlikely to Guzmán Böckler because as he added “I think that persecutions, torture as they said, 
was not true, not true, and if there was any type of violence, which cannot be dismissed, it was 
certainly not directed or organized, there has to be violent guys in all periods, one could have 
been violent I don’t disagree. But something decisive from the government, a policy in that 
sense, no, no, no, because I was close to all of that and I remember.”103  
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101 “Entrevista Carlos Guzmán Böckler.” The electric pipe refers to the metal object the student claimed was used by 
the police to penetrate him. These were some of the jokes made about the Quiñonez brothers.  
 
102 Ibid. Carlos Guzmán Böckler began his work in the Guatemalan tribunals in 1949 when he was an intern whose 
work consisted of studying various cases before passing them to the judge for trial. This task required close contact 
with the people related to the cases and the sentencing, like the accusers, the prosecutor, witnesses, experts, family 




Carlos Guzmán Böckler also noted that the attitude of the police of the revolution was 
very different from that of the dictatorship. He remembered one ex-officer nicknamed veneno, 
poison, and of his conversations with him, “the guy would tell me that the respect on the part of 
the people towards the police had been lost, he [poison] remembered that when he was an active 
officer during the time of the General [Ubico], people said: here comes the police let’s get the 
fuck out. Now they say here come the Civil Guard, let’s kick their ass.”104 This statement 
showed that even the perception that the old police had of the revolutionary police changed and 
ex-officers saw it as weak.  
Nonetheless, solely based on police or student records it is not possible arrive to a 
conclusion about the tortures. Both Barnoya and Guzmán Böckler remembered that after the 
sabotage acts, in the Huelga de Dolores, and in the university, the apprehended students were 
mocked and called liars for their cries of torture. If the accusations of torture were true it seems 
unlikely that the students ridicule the incident since in years later when torture and human right 
violations were clearly happening the Huelga never dared to ridicule that suffering.  
 
Long term Consequences, the radicalization of the CEUA and its transformation into the 
CEUAGE 
The arrest warrants directed at various members of the CEUA sparked the flight of other 
members of the group who were not accused of any crime but who belonged to the group. 
Several of these individuals fled to the Central American embassies in the country and sought 
asylum alleging government persecution. The CEUA was not disbanded, however, once abroad 
they remained organized in the Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas 




Students in Exile. From exile these student launched an extensive propaganda campaign against 
the government through their official bulletins, with the help of the Catholic Church and the U.S. 
They produced El Boletín del CEUAGE and a radio program called Radio Liberación.105 The 
Boletín del CEUAGE published its first issue on June 1953 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Each of 
their bulletins showed the motto of the Liberation Movement: God, Fatherland and Freedom. In 
their publication they paid homage to individuals they considered heroes like Javier Arana. They 
also presented their own account of the abuses conducted by the police against the opposition 
along with their own illustrations. Each bulletin came with a section name La Página Roja, The 
Red Page, which they encouraged their readers to detach and distribute as it contained the “truth” 
about the government. The Páginas Rojas contained shocking and sensationalist accusations 
against the government. Radio Liberación, began to air on May 1954. It served as a propaganda 
campaign and was directed by Leonel Sisniega Otero, Mario López Villatoro and José Torón 
Barrios. The radio reached Guatemalan households advertising the impending victory of the 
liberation army over the Guatemalan communist government.106  
In exile, the students contacted Coronel Carlos Castillo Armas who had escaped with five 
others from a Guatemalan prison on June 1951 with the help of the CEUA. According to 
Sisniega Otero, members of the CEUA helped dig a tunnel and waited for Castillo Armas outside 
the jail. Two cars were ready to wait for him, one driven by Mario Sandoval Alarcón and the 
other one used as a decoy in which Sisniega Otero rode. The CEUA took Castillo Armas to the 
Colombian embassy, from which he later left for to Honduras107.  Castillo Armas would proclaim 
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106 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, “Historia del glorioso Movimiento de Liberación Nacional”,10. Mario 
Lopez and José Torón were later killed by guerrilla forces.  
 
107 Sisniega Otero, “Entrevista Leonel Sisniega Otero.” 
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himself the leader of the liberación which provided a unifying movement for the elites, 
disenchanted military, the ultra conservative catholic church, and the sections of the middle 
classes who despite having nothing to lose from the revolutionary reforms opposed the regime, 
and of course for the U.S., to gather in their quest to overthrow Arbenz.  
After a long anticommunist propaganda campaign funded by the U.S. government through 
the CIA, they managed to instill not only fear in the populations, but also in the military forces 
who turned their back on Arbenz. Castillo Armas occupied Chiquimula on June 24, 1954 and 
proclaimed the triumph of the Liberación while U.S. planes bombed Guatemala City and 
dropped leaflets creating a state of panic in the population of a large-scale invasion.108 President 
Arbenz decided to resign on June 27th 1954 stating in his last speech, “we fought to where our 
conditions would allow it, until a point in which to go further would mean losing everything we 
have gained since 1944.”109Castillo Armas became president through a popular referendum and 
not through elections. For 18 months he ruled by presidential decrees and it was not until 
February 1956 that he established a new Constitution. Despite the accusations of the United 
States against the government of Arbenz and the opposition that stormed in the country holding 
the banner of anticommunism to defend a country they portrayed as on the brink of falling to 
Soviet control, “no serious evidence ever turned up after the coup establishing a secret tie to the 
Soviets.”110 After the coup the leadership of the AEU was forced into exile, and the military 
government appointed a conservative emergency group to head the AEU.111 However after a 
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couple of months, elections were once again held in the university and groups opposed to the 
government gained control of the AEU.  
At the time of the coup, the governing body of the AEU, which had taken office on 
September 1953, was the first group during the revolution to run on a more explicit leftist 
platform. They were nominated and supported by the Frente Universitario Democrático, FUD, a 
more radical leftist group with some ties to the PGT.112 Regardless of their connection with the 
PGT, through their new leaders, the AEU took a more firm public position in defense of Arbenz 
and his democratic government. They also decided to steer the university in a new direction 
where politics and the arts could coexist. The group’s short period in office left behind the first 
and only magazine published by the AEU at the time. Cuadernos Universitarios, as it was called, 
not only included literary pieces from Guatemalan authors but it also included a section on 
politics, clearly leaving behind the discourse that the AEU was apolitical. One of the highlights 
of the first and only issue of Cuadernos was the speech delivered by Jorge Toriello defending 
Guatemala’s sovereignty against the United States in a meeting of the Organization of American 
States held in Venezuela. In the meeting, Secretary of State of the U.S. John Foster Dulles 
wanted to pass a resolution against communism, although not stated explicitly, the resolution 
was directed at Guatemala. Despite the praises Toriello Received for his speech willing to defy 
the United States, the resolution passed, only Guatemala voted against it.113 
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On the eve of the fall of the Arbenz Government, the AEU, through its president Roberto 
Díaz Castillo, called on the population to defend the national sovereignty against foreign 
infiltration.114 At the same time members and leadership of the FUD, as well as other politically 
conscious and organized groups asked the army for weapons to arm the students against the 
invasion, but the army had already turned their backs on Arbenz.115 The Police also underwent a 
very rapid transformation; once again the institution was disbanded and replaced by the Servicio 
de Seguridad, a temporary security force, under direct control of the President, mainly in charge 
of arresting alleged communists.  
After the coup, the members of the CEUAGE returned to the country and were appointed 
to various posts in the new military government. As strong defenders of the new regime, they 
created lists with names of students they portrayed as communist or revolutionary.116  Mario 
Sandoval Alarcón was freed from the prison in Salamá where he was held on charges of 
participating in an unsuccessful insurrection by a general against the government. Sandoval 
Alarcón was quickly appointed private secretary to the president. Sisniega Otero was given a job 
as a director of a radio station and Goicolea was appointed Minister of Foreign Relations.  The 
anticommunist groups also coalesced in a new political party, the Movimiento de Liberación 
Nacional, MLN, a product from the combination of the CEUAGE and the Partido Unificación 
Anticomunista, PUA, the Party of Anticommunist Unification.  
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Conclusion 
If the CEUA began as a “grupusculo de culecos” during the revolutionary regime, it would 
not remain one for long. In exile this group managed to remain organized and united with 
disaffected military and with the support of the U.S. government. Their position in the country 
would flourish during the counterrevolution with terrible consequences. The group’s importance, 
regardless of its numbers, was their ability to show that “the mobilization of the students was not 
only about leftist protests.”117 Despite the fact that conservative sectors would no longer in the 
future gain control of the important university associations or the AEU, their ability to mobilize 
and gather support from other groups with different ideological beliefs during this time showed 
that “in the social sectors the direction of each needs to be constructed daily,”118 and that is 
exactly what the CEUA accomplished. A construction of a conservative opposition within the 
university with deeply rooted conservatism and that until this day, those alive and until their 
death those who already died defended their ideologies and remained unapologetic for their 
actions or beliefs.  
At the same time, the temporary alliance of other university associations, most importantly 
the AEU, with the CEAU despite clear ideological differences is key. The alliance showed that 
the support of members of the AEU was to the democratic processes not to the leaders or figures 
in power. The AEU helped the CEUA because they disapproved of any type of human right 
abused regardless of the inflictor. The AEU could have dismissed the opposition, instead they 
decided to work with the CEUA and respect their opinions. Guzmán Blöcker said that during the 
democratic regime “we learned in the [student] sessions to discuss, vote, and to respect the 
winner, to respect the voice of the majority, […] we learned to be tolerant, they later denied that 
                                                        
117 Álvarez A., Conventos, aulas y trincheras.  
 
118 Ibid, 287. 
 48 
to us.”119 Learning to respect all opinions allowed them to support others regardless of ideology 
when they believed violations had occurred, but as Guzmán Böckler said, this group would not 
be so tolerant in the future.  
In terms of the governmental response, in the aftermath of the Atentados, the administration 
did not go on a national crusade to arrest all opposition and label them as threat. Voiding 
constitutional guarantees was never suggested by any government official. All of the students 
accused were eventually freed and the process against them was simply as suspects of these 
sabotage tactics, they were never publicly labeled as a threat for the country. It is perhaps also 
important to add that the atentados coincided with the approval of Decree 900, the land reform. 
The law by itsef was alreday creating opposition and conflict and the president was on a media 
campaign to calm the opposers of such law. Thus the government was doing its best to avoid 
conflict. 
So was the police a truly reformed institution compatible with the new democratic State? The 
fact was that the police carried out very few arrests and the list they provided of individuals 
implicated was short. It was clear that the governement worked hard to create a new image of the 
institution in the minds of the population but attempting to do so without structural reforms was 
an error. While a reform of the ethos consistent with democratic ideals was clearly important, so 
was the need for structural changes within the police’s legal framework. Structural changes in 
police law could have created different hierarchies within the force with more accountability to 
the government and the civilian population. These reforms would have help assure possibility of 
abuses were diminished if not eliminated and also made it less likely for groups to claim the 
police continued to be oppressive as it had been in the past authoritarian government. While the 
revolutionary government failed to see changes in the Police’s Ley Orgánica as necessary, the 
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counterrevolutionary governement did not. The police after the fall of the revolution underwent 
extensive practical but also structural legislative change turning it into a truly repressive force as 

























Efemérides Estudiantil Universitaria: The Student Killings of June 1956 
 
 
“Cara de Hacha” iba ordenando, Santo Lima asesinando, Monseñor felicitando, de León 
Cardona Acusando. Esta “cuarteta maestra” logro en un junio execrado, ganar la 
“vuelta siniestra” de Guatemala al pasado!  




After 1944, June 25th was remembered as the beginning of the large-scale social 
mobilizations that ousted Jorge Ubico from power, but it also served as a date of remembrance 
for the death of teacher Maria Chinchilla, who was mortally wounded by government forces 
during a protest that day. The university and various other social sectors continued to 
commemorate the date as a civic celebration in the name of liberty and freedom from the tyranny 
of the past dictatorship.  Sadly, on June of 1956, the date would serve as remembrance of another 
event, the killing of university students by police forces under the command of notorious figures 
from the past. Therefore, the murder of the students can be considered as a return to the 
institutionalized violence that the revolutionary era had attempted to change but that Castillo 
Armas and his supporters seemed eager to return to. Opposition and unrest would be trampled 
and police forces began serving as tools for the state to carry out its Cold War policies of fighting 
communism.  
This chapter will explore how the counterrevolutionary government manipulated the 
events of June to portray them as a communist insurrection that threatened the “democracy” of 
the country. Along with the past anticommunist student group, turned political party, the 
government supported and deemed necessary a policy of institutionalized repression against all 
opposition. To carry out their plan, the police underwent a restructuration of its law compatible 
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with the government’s new aim of eliminating communism. To further achieve this goal, the 
police was placed under control of infamous figures of Ubico’s dictatorship whose past 
significance would perfectly represent the government’s desire to revert any change 
accomplished by the revolutionary era and accomplish a return to the idolized past of Ubico’s 
rule.  
 
The March of June 25th 1956  
On the first days of June 1956, various social groups began the requesting permits from 
the government to carry out their various commemorative events to celebrate June 25th. By 
Friday June 22, according to El Impacial, four groups “of anticommunist tendency” were 
authorized to carry out their events on June 24th and June 25th. The events included a 
peregrination to the cemetery as well as a gathering and speeches in the central plaza of 
Guatemala City. The celebrations began on Sunday the 24th because that year the remains of 
Maria Chinchilla would be transferred to the official teacher’s mausoleum. The paper also 
presented the government’s feeble excuse to prevent the student association El Derecho and the 
AEU to participate in the festivities, arguing that other groups were already given permission to 
carry out events and therefore times for their activities would overlap.120  
As a response, the students decided to carry out the bulk of their activities on Sunday 
because they were aware that the groups who were having activities on Monday were groups 
allied with the government and were planted simply to participate as members of a 
“contramanifestación.” The AEU replied to the Castillista administration’s obstacles and 
hesitation to allow the students to participate in the celebratory activities by issuing a public 
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June 21, 1956; “Cuatro grupos manifestaran y harán mitin el domingo entrante,” El Imparcial, June 22, 1956. 
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declaration on Saturday June 23, stating that the celebrations of June 25th served as remembrance 
of the civic struggle for freedom and belonged to all the citizens of Guatemala. The AEU also 
declared the university “free of political influence,” a quote most likely used to appease the 
president and Ministro de Gobernación who feared that participation of student groups could turn 
into a protest against their administration.121  
There was also another reason that made the date special for the students and the 
university. The AEU’s declaration also stated that from 1956 on, the 25th of June would be 
declared a day of student celebration with the name of “efemérides estudiantil universitaria”. To 
celebrate the day in which “the flag of dignity and university autonomy was hoisted […] and it is 
precise that this date is recorded of imperishable form in the memory of the university students, 
as an example and encouragement for the defense of freedom.”122  The students planned to gather 
at eight in the morning outside the building of the law school and then march to Maria 
Chinchilla’s tomb. Saturday’s paper declared that the Asociación El Derecho organized the 
march and that the students finally had the permission of the government for their activities.123  
However the governor of the capital warned, “the demonstrations can be carried out as long as 
they respect the public order and article 62, and article 59 of the Preventive Law Against 
Communism.”124  
On Monday morning June 25th, the public woke up to the news that the government had 
placed into affect Estado de Alarma. The press also reported that various arrests were carried out 
against ‘communists’ from one of the groups that participated in the events of the previous day. 
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Still, the most significant events were yet to occur, Sunday’s peregrination would set off a series 
of coordinated and synchronized police actions aimed at suppressing any celebratory activities. 
Prior to reaching Maria Chinchilla’s tomb, the students learned that patrol cars, policemen and 
soldiers had surrounded the cemetery. Thus, the students dispersed and returned to the law 
school where at ten in the morning police forces encircled the building and threatened to kill any 
of the 500 there gathered if anyone attempted to leave.125 After two hours of being held hostage, 
the students were allowed to exit, but the building remained surrounded by policemen until the 
next day. At the same time, under orders of Colonel Santos Miguel Lima Bonilla, the police, 
with the pretext that they were investigating a murder, broke into the building of the school of 
medicine.126  
Other social groups and students congregated in the Barrios Plaza after being prevented 
from entering the cemetery. At the plaza among the participants news spread that the previous 
night throughout the city various prominent student leaders and lawyers were arrested after 
attending a human rights meeting at the University.127 When the police began to disperse group, 
the people gathered began shouting, “shoot us, kill us, we don’t want dictatorship!” They also 
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126 Junta Directiva Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios AEU, “Por la verdad de un hecho histórico,” March 29, 
1957, Correspondencia 1940-59 No. 58 Cuarta Transferencia, Archivo AEU. Colonel Santos Miguel Lima Bonilla 
was at the time third chief of the Guatemalan National Police.  He also had a career in publishing. A book published 
by the Army in 1966 accredited Lima Bonilla with at least 22 publications. The topics of his works varied greatly 
from women’s fertility calendar to poetry and world history. The events described in the chapter illustrate his 
brutality and fervent anticommunism; the guerrilla killed him in the 1960’s. One of his sons and grandson also 
fervent anticommunists had a military career and are currently serving jail sentences for the murder of Monseñor 
Juan Gerardi. Monseñor Gerardi was murdered days after he presented the Guatemalan Catholic Church’s truth 
report, Guatemala Nunca Mas, which unveiled the brutalities committed by the army during the 36 years of the 
armed conflict.  
 
127 Rodolfo Azmitia Jiménez, La represión Del 25 de junio de 1956, 4th ed., Publicaciones CIEPRODH (Guatemala: 
Centro de Investigación, Estudio y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos, 1992). The individuals detained were José 
Luis Barcalcel, president of El Derecho, the lawyers José Bocaletti, Héctor Zachrisson and Mario Monteforte 
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opposition against the government. It is also important to mention that some of these individuals arrested had 
participated in a round table that day regarding human rights. 
 54 
began saying: “unite! unite!” to try to prevent the police from evacuating them. The group 
managed to move to the statue of Justo Rufino Barrios where they tried to place a national flag 
and began singing the national anthem. Soon the plaza was saturated with policemen and the 
people, traffic, and even journalists were evacuated from the area. A small group attempted to 
gather on nearby streets but when Santos Lima realized this he ordered “clean that street one way 
or another, if they want bullets, give them bullets, if they want a beating, give them a beating”, 
after hearing these orders, the people finally dispersed.128  
 The next day, Monday, June 25th, the AEU called for an emergency session to discuss the 
events of the previous day. They decided to draft a memo asking the president for the release of 
the detainees as well as for the return of constitutional rule and to protest “the disrespect of the 
police to enter […] the university and surround the law school.”129 The last petition was 
extremely important because given its autonomy the university was considered sovereign 
territory by the student body. 
During the emergency session the students also discussed how to present the memo, and 
whether to simply deliver it to the president’s office or to march to the central plaza and read it 
publicly. The overwhelming majority of students decided on the latter, and around 8:30 p.m. 
about 300 students began a peaceful march led by the directive of the AEU while everyone sang 
the national anthem.130 After advancing a couple of blocks and reaching 11 street and sixth 
avenue, a very busy intersection and right outside one of the major movie theaters, the students 
encountered rows of police officers and soldiers, “prepared as if to combat another army” 
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commanded by Santos Lima and Bernabé Linares.131 With no warning the officers began 
shooting at the students who attempted to take cover on the sidewalks and doors yet continued 
singing the anthem. The police began rounding up students and arresting them. After the violent 
tumult was over, three students were dead, around 30 were taken to the emergency room, many 
in critical condition, where two more died and more than 200 were arrested.132 The executive 
with the support of congress immediately imposed martial law placing the Ministerio de la 
Defensa in control of the courts, the police and the media and cancelled all constitutional 
guarantees arguing an imminent threat by communists planning to destabilize and overthrow the 
government.133  
 
The AEU’s Response 
The public response of the AEU to the actions of the security forces was not very strong 
due to the martial law instituted by Castillo Armas. The university association asked students to 
abstain from public manifestations in order to avoid the “murderous bullets of the police” and it 
instituted a general student strike.134 The A.E.U. quickly organized and assigned a group of 
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lawyers to make arrangements to free the detainees and fight the charges against them.135 The 
next day the AEU issued a statement informing the public they had petitioned the president for 
the release of the apprehended students, and for the immediate destitution of the police 
authorities responsible for the killings.136 Two days later they issued a bulleting containing their 
own version of the events since the government had declared press censorship. The students 
stated their march had been peaceful, they were not armed, and that the police fired against 
them.137 As a way to deal with the censorship, they also asked students to make typewriter copies 
of the subsequent bulletins issued by the association and to distribute them.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, what had occurred in June of 1952 when various groups offered 
their support and solidarity to the anticommunist students arrested despite strong ideological 
differences, did not happen in 1956. Conservative groups, the former CEUA, by then a political 
party, and the Catholic Church sided and defended the government and the police actions.138 The 
dislike of pro-government groups and the administration itself against the AEU had increasingly 
grown after a series of actions of the AEU to protest what they considered an unconstitutional 
government. A section of university students had opposed the plebiscite that allowed Castillo 
Armas to take power without proper democratic elections.139 The students also repudiated the 
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presence of the dean of Columbia University, who declared Castillo Armas Doctor Honoris 
Causa. He was set to deliver a series of speeches in the University of San Carlos, which the 
students promptly tried to prevent. The university students and AEU had also publicly criticized 
the government especially the police for the torture of prisoner, Rogelio Rivera Sánchez.140 They 
had voiced their support for a report delivered by the Secretary General of the United Nations 
Dag Hammarskjöld, which condoned the policy of the Castillo Armas’ government against the 
labor movement. Finally, on the 23rd a day before the tragic events, the university and the AEU 
organized a series of roundtable discussions regarding human rights. Several of the participants 
of the roundtable were arrested that same night. 
After the student massacre, since public protests were not a possibility, the students 
sought other means to express their outrage and their support for the students arrested. The AEU 
asked all university students from abstaining to show up to their jobs and everyday activities. 
The order was mainly directed at medicine and law students, who played important roles in 
Guatemalan society.141 Since doctors and student residents from the University of San Carlos ran 
the general hospital of the city, they decided to refuse to treat anyone except for the wounded 
students and the emergency room.142 The students working in the hospital also helped escape 
some of the wounded students who the police kept attempting to arrest despite their critical 
conditions. The actions of the med students were the first step towards a general student strike. 
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Law students working as interns in all the legislative offices and courts were supposed to be the 
second group to strike but they failed to organize and the attempted general strike died out.143  
The university student association also asked for the resignation of the Ministro de 
Gobernación Eduardo Rodríguez Genis, since the national police was under his and Castillo 
Armas’ direct orders at the time of the attack. The students also wanted the chiefs of police 
Bernabé Linares, Santos Lima Bonilla and Aparicio Cahueque discharged from their posts. The 
AEU also supported the family of the victims who began a criminal processes against the police 
chiefs who gave the orders to shoot the students, Lima and Linares. A recent law graduate, 
Carlos Guzmán Böckler, served as the legal representative for the mothers and wives of the five 
students killed. The courts nonetheless quickly dismissed the case; the attitude of the court and 
security forces in regards to the students was uncooperative. Since the beginning when the AEU 
began to organize the release of the individuals arrested, they issued Recursos de Exhibición to 
see the detainees but the police continued denying having certain people under arrest.144 
 
The Government’s response  
 The government declared that the confrontations of June 24th and 25th were a long- 
planned act of communist aggression against the democratic regime. However, even before the 
incidents the government had used the term “communist” to refer to the students and had hinted 
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that communists might attempt to act on that date. In a press statement the governor of 
Guatemala City declared, “within the proverbial scope of the democratic regime, licenses have 
been distributed to various groups to carry out demonstrations”; however if any “communist 
group” attempted to control any of the manifestations for their own benefit all the extent of the 
law would be used against them.145  
Castillo Armas’ opinions regarding the university students were contradictory. On the 
one hand, he believed that under the disguise of ‘student associations’ “true schools of 
communism” were being formed. But at the same time he was grateful to the “university youth, 
nerve and life of the Liberation Movement,” referring to the members of the CEUA, who first 
developed within the university setting and who helped him escape from prison and continued 
supporting him while in exile.146 He was careful to expand the idea that foreign communist 
infiltrators were affecting the sections of the university and certain associations, but especially 
the law school. The government also upheld autonomy as a way to gain the support of the 
university since as the previous chapter showed, the associations could at times be under 
influence or control of conservative groups, which he hoped would happen again during his 
government.  
In terms of legality, the government argued its actions on Sunday were completely legal 
under Decree No. 587 that instituted state of alarm in the country on Sunday the 24th. However 
the students argued that the decree was issued on the same day of their morning peregrination 
and they were not informed of it.147 On Tuesday June 26, newspaper headlines read that Estado 
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de Sitio, martial law, had been imposed throughout the country.148 The Ministerio de la Defensa 
published an official statement of the events of the 25th. The Ministro de Defensa claimed the 
students were violating the state of emergency imposed that Sunday, which prohibited public 
congregation. The Ministro, along with the president, affirmed that students were the first to act 
violently firing shots at the police who had no other option but to defend themselves and protect 
the public order.149 The accusations against the students also included an explanation of how 
student disobedience was part of a large-scale conspiracy against the government.150 Another 
declaration claimed the police had confiscated weapons from the students and the newspaper ran 
the pictures of six revolvers, several machetes and hand grenades.151The alleged use of machetes 
–a rural tool- as a weapon employed by urban middle class university students appeared more as 
a way to relate the students to the labor or peasant movements. The claim that the students had 
weapons was used as a pretext that allowed the government to search and arrest any individual 
that seemed suspicious as well as the right to search residences of “known communists.”  
The Ministro de Gobernación as the official spokesperson from the government also 
blamed the students for allowing themselves to be influenced by communist individuals. He 
claimed that Vicente Lombardo Toledano, an important Mexican labor leader, had arrived to 
Guatemala to give the students instructions for an insurrection.152 The Director of National 
Security, Ismael Ortiz Orellana, backed up the declarations of the Ministro de la Defensa and the 
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Ministro de Gobernación about foreign communist intervention in student organizations and 
reported that the government had exiled 35 individuals from the country for their participation in 
the events.153 Ortiz Orellana said it was sad to observe how “the student body […] was being 
used by communism.” As proof he presented to the members of the press a manifesto issued by 
the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT, in which they exalted the contributions of the 
revolutionary government, shunned the return of figures from Ubico’s dictatorship and exalted 
people to participate in the events of June 25th. He also claimed to have proof of the connection 
between foreign communists and the “instigators” of the protests. For Ortiz Orellana it was too 
much of a coincidence the similarities of discourse between communist publications and certain 
student owned newspapers.154 The army, through the Ministerio de la Defensa, also issued a 
statement blaming the university students for creating within a university association a “pro-
communist nucleus.”   
According to Ministro de Defensa, “a university student, as any other citizen, is free to 
profess any political ideas they consider better […] although of course he could not be a member 
of communist groups.”155 This statement also said that the university as a whole should not be 
categorized as communist simply by the actions of a small group of “communist fanatics.” To 
end his statement the Ministro also emphasized that it was the responsibility of the university 
students to act in such a manner that would not jeopardize the university autonomy.  
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The Ministro de Gobernación declared that while the government had all the proof 
necessary to act with “the most effective control and repression, to avoid that the true cultural 
aim of our University is distorted”, they would not do so in order to respect its autonomy. Instead 
the Ministro added: the government “limits its power of authority, in relation to the student body, 
from university doors out, where all the citizens must be measured with the same standard of 
equality required before the law.”156 The government did not apologize for the deaths of the 
students but instead blamed them on the ‘irresponsible’ student leaders who allowed the march.  
In relation to the weapons attributed to the students in their first public statement the 
government claimed one officer had died and many had been injured. Other reports claimed only 
one police officer had been hit in the head157. Two days later the Ministro de Gobernación 
published the picture of an officer injured in the attacks against the students. Officer Raúl 
Sánchez Rodriguez of the national police, according to the government was hospitalized as a 
result of the violent acts of the students.158 A list was later issued to El Imparcial with the names 
and types of wound sustained by the police officers. Officer Sánchez’s wound was the most 
grave, consisting of a bullet strafing the side of his face. The described wounds of the rest of the 
officers were: wounds to their arms, feet, and fingers, closely differentiating between thumbs and 
pinkies. Despite what appeared to be not serious injuries, the officers were being cared for in a 
hospital. 
The students arrested on the 24th and 25th were accused of sedition. The Procurador 
General de la Nación, Manuel de León Cardona tried to lobby so that they could be judged in a 
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military tribunal and given the death penalty. His petition was consistent with the fact that the 
courts under the martial law were placed under the control of the armed forces, however the 
courts requested to maintain their autonomy and not be subject to military control. But in the 
criminal cases, the students were still charged with the crime of sedition. The following days, the 
press reported that the arrests against possible suspects continued. Based on the liberties 
provided by the martial law, the police could arrest and use violence against anyone on the street 
after nine at night. The police also warned, “every person caught in suspicious activities will be 
persecuted and punished.”159 The police then began arresting students, teachers and lawyers who, 
as part of the university’s actions, were presenting Recursos de Exhibición and aiding with the 
legal proceedings for those arrested on the 24th and 25th. 160 Castillo Armas warned that the 
arrests would continue, “until the country was completely cleaned of communists and 
agitators.”161 As part of the martial law, the government declared that it would censor all media. 
The students were not allowed to refute the stories accusing them of being communists. The few 
newspapers that were critical of the government had their owners and editors arrested the 
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Police Transformation: The New Police Code 
In 1955 Castillo Armas passed a new Ley Orgánica de la Policía Nacional through 
Decree 332 and reverted the name of Guardia Civil back to its “more historic” Policía Nacional. 
This change was the first governmental change to the Ley orgánica of the police since 1940 
when Jorge Ubico had instituted his own. But Castillo Armas’ more immediate change soon after 
taking power was the creation of the Servicio de Seguridad in September 1954.163 The Servicio 
de Seguridad was under the direct control of the president and it was in charge of carrying out 
the duties of the Guardia Judicial. In February 1956 Castillo Armas issued more definite 
instructions regarding the Servicio de Seguridad by substituting it with the Dirección General de 
Seguridad Nacional, under the authority of the Ministerio de Gobernación but for the first time 
with jurisdiction over the National Police. As part of the structural changes, there was also an 
emphasis on militarizing the police and U.S. advisors arrived to the country to help restructure 
the new force.164  
The Dirección de Seguridad Nacional was divided in three departments: Seguridad, 
Judicial, and Jurídico Administrativo. The Departamento de Seguridad became the more 
important in the following years because it included the Committee of Defense Against 
Communism, whose job it was to prevent and combat any communist action or individuals in the 
country, and became  “the contemporary version of the inquisition.”165 The official functions of 
the Department of Security were to “investigate, prevent, uncover, persecute and monitor against 
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political crimes.” It was divided in two sections, Sección de Servicio Secreto and the Sección de 
Defensa Contra el Comunismo u Otros Sistemas Totalitarios.166  
The Secret Service section was in charge of investigating confidential cases for the state. 
Their duties were to “investigate, denounce and prevent criminal acts against the security of the 
state and the public order.” The duties of the Defense Against Communism section were to 
“investigate, control, monitor, denounce, and persecute communist activities.” Communist 
activities were defined by the Ley Preventiva Penal Contra el Comunismo but also included 
other “totalitarian systems that by their methods or procedures represent a danger to society and 
its democratic institutions.”167 This section was also in charge of capturing people accused of 
communist activities and turning them over to the justice system. Their officers and offices were 
given complete access to the records of any other state agency in order to facilitate the 
effectiveness of their duties. The agents who worked for the entire Departamento de Seguridad 
were not required to identify themselves as such unless they were carrying out an arrest, search 
warrant or when required by another higher authority. Due to their incognito position, some of 
these agents began to go undercover in the university to alert of any communist or subversive 
activity in campus or student sessions. 
 The duties historically carried out by the Policía Judicial transferred to the Departamento 
Judicial, the second of the three branches. Their duties remained the same as the Policía Judicial, 
to arrest and investigate common crimes against people and property. Regarding the Policía 
Nacional, Castillo Armas instituted the new Ley orgánica in an attempt to ‘modernize’ it and 
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facilitate its duties.168 The new law reaffirmed one of the few changes of the 1944 constitution 
regarding the police, which transformed it into a civil institution. The new law stressed that the 
police would receive training and specialization to attain a “professional character.” Article 7 of 
the new law also stated that the police was “a disciplined, apolitical and obedient institution.”169  
 Two Memoria de Labores related to the counterrevolutionary period led by Castillo 
Armas, the Memoria de Labores of 1955 and the Memoria de Labores de Quetzaltenango of the 
same year. In his annual report, the director of the National Police of Guatemala assured the 
president that the entity was reorganized to fit its new law. In the director’s summary of events it 
is clear that the rhetoric once again changed to fit the new regime and also the new enemy: 
communists. The Memorias note an increased number of arrests on the crime of communism. 
Despite the fact that the new Police was supposed to be “apolitical,” on June 2, according to their 
records, commemorative plaques were unveiled in the headquarters of the police with legends 
thanking the Ejército Nacional Libertador for their actions of June 29th 1954, referring to the 
coup against the Arbenz government.170 The Memoria de Labores of Quetzaltenango, the second 
largest and important city of Guatemala, also supported the new regime. The past government 
described by the chief was “an anarchy whose regime kept the Guatemalan family in division 
and if it had continued the consequences would have been disastrous.” The Memoria ended with 
the words God, Fatherland and Freedom, the signature slogan of the Liberation movement.171 
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The Memorias also show a stronger emphasis placed on the section in charge of 
identification. A fragment read, “the increase in the identification task […] was a superior 
achievement, it managed to obtain ten thousand three hundred twenty five index files during the 
year.” The accomplishment was important since according to the police, “the effectiveness of a 
Cabinet of Identification is based precisely on the amount of files available in its archives.” 172  
These files, of course, would serve as an index to note not only criminal acts but also for the 
monitoring of Guatemalan citizens. However the fichas also show that it was no longer simply 
the police in charge of investigating, monitoring, and keeping tabs on the opposition. One ficha 
mentioned a secret group named Relampago, which as noted in the document, was spying on El 
Derecho and also alerted the government that the students would march on June 1956.173  
I was able to find some fichas corresponding to a number of the deceased and participants 
in the march of June 25th. Salvador Orozco, one of the students killed, had a ficha that began on 
1955 noting that he was elected secretary of the association El Derecho in June 1955. A later 
annotation mentioned that he was expressing his discontent about the government, and that he 
participated and was wounded in the march of June 25, 1956. His ficha ended the year after his 
death in 1957, when it reported that a peregrination visited his tomb.174  Julio Juárez Pérez, 
another student killed, had a ficha that began in 1953 when he was accused of robbery. The next 
annotation to his file was in 1956 when his death was reported and that a group of students met 
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to protest his death. The last notation to his ficha dated from 1957, when the National Police 
passed photographs of him to the General Directory of National Security.175  
Another individual whose ficha was noteworthy was that of Jorge E. Rosal, the only 
person who held the presidency of the AEU in two occasions. His first term was during the 
presidency of Jacobo Arbenz, he was the president of the AEU during the Atentados Dinamiteros 
of June 1952. However, his ficha began until 1955 when he was labeled a communist but also 
noted that he worked in the hospital of the National Police.176 Rosal’s work in the hospital began 
after the fall of the revolution as a way to aid those apprehended by the liberation movement for 
political reasons.177 His ficha explained that he participated, was wounded and arrested during 
the march of June 25, 1956. Information about him continued until the 1970’s, with several 
notations for both political reason and for crimes reported against him. Other fichas described 
individuals who were deemed communists and instigators of the events of June 1956.178 These 
fichas illustrate how some students were being monitored and catalogued as communists even 
before the June events. 
These police documents aid in understanding how the language and idea of 
anticommunism quickly permeated the police and dictated its actions. Despite the accusations 
against Santos Lima, the case did not advance. Since Santos Lima was a member of the army; he 
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could not be tried in regular courts but instead any accusations against him had to be decided by 
a military tribunal.179 In July Castillo Armas substituted Santos Lima Bonilla from his post as 
Inspector General of the National Police.180 By the end of July newspapers reported that the 
process against Santos Lima and two other police officers had begun. However, the article also 
reported that Santos Lima was soon departing on a scholarship to Panamá where he was to 
specialize in the formation and organization of militarized police.181 Lima’s scholarship was in 
fact one to attend the School of the Americas, since as their records show he attended the course 
on militarized police from July to September 1956.182 Santos Lima training in militarization of 
the police was part of the government’s aim to militarize the police to adapt it to the changing 
needs of the country.183 Militarization, said the new Inspector General, Rubén Gonzáles Rivera, 
was necessary not as a way to intimidate the population, but to instill better discipline in the 
personnel and extend control in rural areas.184After Santos Lima departed from the country, the 
military tribunal decided to place the process on hold until his return, in fact simply dismissing 
all the charges against him. Carlos Guzmán Böckler, the families’ lawyer even asked for the 
death penalty against Lima; however, the tribunal did not accept the evidence he presented and 
dropped the charges. As a last defiant act Guzmán Böckler asked the judges “if they were a court 
of law, or servants of a dictatorship. Of course they did not answer.”185 
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In the days and weeks following June 25th, the courts ordered the release of a number of 
students arrested, citing lack of evidence to continue a case against them. Others were released 
on bail and continued fighting the charges against them and the police continued investigations 
to link them to communist organizations.  Releases were not immediate, since the police denied 
having some individuals under their control. Many were exiled to other Central American 
countries like Honduras and Costa Rica. The government maintained martial law for two 
months, since according to the Ministro de Gobernación “the communists are still very insolent” 
and investigations needed to continue.186 
 
La Crisis se Da por Terminada, la Democracia No Ha Sido Lesionada: Long Term 
Consequences and Institutionalized Violence 
On June 17th, 1956, Mario Sandoval Alarcón, who served as the private secretary for 
president Castillo Armas, delivered a speech where he called for the use of institutionalized 
violence if necessary to stop the communist threat. He stated, “the time for mercy has ended” and  
“the era of organized violence” had begun. His speech marked the celebration of the first year of 
his recently formed political party. The Movimiento Democrático Nacionalista, MDN, stressed 
that in order to defend democracy, “it is legal and necessary to reach the extremes of force and 
power, aggressiveness, and passion if necessary.”187 Sandoval and his followers would continue 
to develop this belief in future years and turn their violent points of view into brutal and horrific 
organizations such as death squads one of the most infamous being Mano Blanca.188  
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After the June events, the government publicly agreed with the official statement of the 
MDN by stating that the recent events justified their declarations.189 The MDN was not the first 
to ask the government for the use of violence against opposition. In March of that same year on 
the eve of the Huelga de Dolores, Monseñor Rossell y Arellano, an archconservative supporter of 
the counterrevolution, called for the intervention of the police against the Huelga and the 
students involved in it claiming that behind “that buffoonery of bad taste and lack of culture, 
hides the communist brutality against the people of Guatemala.”190 Rossell’s statement forced 
the AEU to issue statement declaring its absolute support for the Huelga. The association also 
expressed that any violence of security forces against university students would be blamed on 
Rossell’s call for violence against a group of students who were simply carrying on a 
longstanding university tradition that had only been repressed during the era of Ubico.191  
A group of Guatemalan women had also started issuing public statements declaring: 
“communists are using to the student body and to other national sectors, to divide the 
Guatemalan family.” They believed “government measures will prevent new acts of blood. The 
communists, we must never forget, are masters of provocation and are only interested in 
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divisions, grief and anguish.”192 These statements serve to show that throughout the country a 
consensus was arising on the part of the Guatemalan conservative groups that institutionalized 
violence was the answer against the “communist” threat. However these groups themselves 
shaped their enemy to fit their flexible communist mold in which any opposition could be 
deemed communist and therefore it was the duty of the government to repress such groups.  
Therefore the political climate in which these students decided to celebrate a civic 
occasion of remembrance for the freedoms obtained in 1944 was filled with the idea that any 
force necessary would be used to quiet the dissident voices. Those in power established a 
political system that no longer allowed freedom of expression and quickly suppressed any 
attempt to challenge the system. Protests by the students would no longer be tolerated and it was 
clear the government would use the police and army against them without hesitation. By 
associating the entirety of the events with foreign communist infiltration, the government 
managed to validate the repression. The government did its best to dislocate the student 
movement by restricting constitutional guarantees, and creating a state of fear and panic in the 
population about a possible communist take over. After the events of June, the government 
warned that it was time university authorities took charge and prevented illegal activities in 
student associations. At the same time through the Ministro de Gobernación the government 
warned “to the university one goes to study and not to turn our highest center of culture into a 
political trench from where a few communist students can conspire […] the government is set to 
end with the subversion and will not tolerate another outbreak.”193  
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The regime’s actions also had several similarities with the era of Ubico given it 
repressive tactics. Nothing could exemplify this better than the return of Bernabé Linares to his 
post as director of the Judicial Police, or the rise of equally brutal figures like Santo Lima 
Bonilla. During the dictatorship of Ubico the infamous Ley Fuga was used as a tactic for the 
police to legally shoot all enemies by claiming that the person in custody attempted to escape. 
Castillo Armas instituted his own version of the law, where the opposition to his government, 
would be labeled as communist thus providing the police with the legal means to repressed it. 
Thus, as the quote at the beginning of the chapter states, these events “marcaron la vuelta 
siniestra de Guatemala al pasado.”194 Once again, it was acceptable for the head of state to use 
repression to deal with the opposition. However, most importantly, it marked a point in which 
the discourse began to emerge that the army and the police would be responsible to keep the 
country safe against external and internal enemies.195 This mention on internal enemies gave 
leverage to the army as well as the police to unite and fight the citizens they had sworn to 
protect.  
During a press statement, Castillo Armas declared: “the crisis has ended, democracy has not 
been harmed”, his words illustrated how the definition of democracy could be stretched to define 
his government which was clearly not democratic.196 Through the structural reforms of the police 
and the new ethos of anticommunism, opponents of the government were suppressed and 
deemed communist and terrorist. Democracy was not hurt because it did not exist in the first 
place. The Guatemalan Police underwent great structural changes affecting its functions and 
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creating new hierarchies. The Policía Judicial transformed into the Dirección de Seguridad, 
which contained the sections of Secret Service and Defense Against Communism, and was given 
more power than the regular National Police. The Committee of Defense Against Communism, 
combined with the loose and over generalized meaning of the term communist, facilitated the 
repression of any opposition. The structural transformations encouraged the police to monitor 
citizens by placing greater emphasis on Section of Identification. 
Despite the repression, student leaders and young professional graduates declared that the 
opposition had to continue fighting. Jorge Mario García, editor of the newspaper El Estudiante 
declared “podemos permitirnos el lujo de perder no una si no muchas batallas. Esta fue una 
pérdida y la otras tendrán que venir.” The student movement did continue to suffer many more 
loses in years to come. The events described in this chapter were only the beginning of a long 
history of repression, torture, disappearances, and murders against university students by various 














On June 25th 1959, the AEU unveiled a plaque on the 6ta Avenida and 11 calle of 
Guatemala City, as homage to the five students killed in that street on June 25th 1956. Similarly, 
the campus of the Universidad de San Carlos is filled with murals, plaques and plazas paying 
tribute to the hundreds of students killed and disappeared by the State’s security forces during 
country’s 36-year civil war. The university students along with the National Police gained great 
significance during the war because of their respective roles in the conflict. The student 
movement after 1956 remained critical of all governments in power and as a result suffered an 
immense amount of state repression through raids, disappearances and murder of students. The 
police became a tool of the State working alongside the army to carry out the repression against 
Guatemalan citizens. However, in order to fully understand the path that each group took during 
this period, it is also necessary to trace how their ideologies developed.  My thesis achieves this 
by providing background and analysis of the students and the police during the 1950’s, an era 
that shaped the ideologies and future radicalization of both entities. The police transitioned from 
being part of a democratic government to being one of the most repressive forces in the country’s 
history. Similarly, the CEUA, which had at first supported Arévalo, aligned itself to the extreme 
right, defenders of institutionalized violence. And the rest of the student movement, which 
started as ‘apolitical’, supported the insurgency forces during the war and many students joined 
the guerrilla lines. 
With the emergence of democracy in 1944, university students, their participation, 
demands and active involvement in the revolutionary government “contributed to the process of 
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nation building.”197  Just as important was their fragmentation into different associations within 
the university as a reaction to the social reforms enacted by the revolutionary regime. For the 
students who belonged to the AEU, their democratic ideals based on the promises of the 1944 
revolution were so strong that in 1952 they opted to align themselves with counterrevolutionary 
students to protest the possible use of torture by the police. During the counterrevolution, 
university students discovered that opposition to the government would no longer be tolerated, 
but instead violently repressed by ghosts of the past that had once again materialized. Also, while 
government forces directed the police to quiet and target the protestors, the anticommunist 
students, by then in positions of power, would not return the favor:  instead of showing the same 
solidarity that the AEU once gave them, they supported and excused the police procedures.  
The police as an institution presented a challenge for the revolutionary government:  how 
should a State institution, infamous for its oppressive tactics during the previous authoritarian 
regime, be transformed and made compatible with the democratic ideals of respect for the rule of 
law professed by the revolution? While the ethos of the police was transformed to meet these 
democratic ideals, the government failed to make structural changes in the police laws to 
reinforce the ideological changes. If the revolutionary government had placed the same emphasis 
on structural changes as they did on ideological change of the police, perhaps the police could 
have served as a true example of an institution compatible with a democratic regime. Police 
reform was necessary because it “is the institutional linchpin in […] establishing the rule of law 
in post authoritarian society,”198 since it will dictate how the country’s security forces, given 
their monopoly on the use of force, will exercise that power.  Moreover, in emerging 
democracies attempting to leave behind their authoritarian past, structural and ideological 
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changes need to be addressed together since “the potential for police violence and the rhetoric 
that would justify it are endemic. The control of violence then, is not automatic; it is a matter of 
policy affected through many institutions, including the management of the police itself as well 
as separate institutions of accountability.”199 If the democratic government had made structural 
reforms of the Ley Orgánica of the police, they would have given it greater legitimacy in 
society’s eyes and perhaps, if the accusations of torture were false, it would have been less likely 
that sectors of the populations like the university students would have believed them.  
When the counterrevolution took power, the institution was transformed by authorities 
that longed to return to a period structured around brutality and order with no considerations for 
the integrity or lives of the country’s citizens. Therefore, Guatemala’s position after 1954 can be 
considered a new version of the pre-1944 past, when new enemies were created and new forms 
of institutionalized repression were instituted. Communism became an umbrella term that could 
be shaped to fit any time of dissenting voice willing to criticize the government and the 
authorities. The Police was transformed in its structure and its ethos to make it compatible with 
this new enemy. The reforms enacted excused the use of excessive force during isolated 
incidents of public disorder as the case of the student march in 1956, but also during everyday 
policing. This was accomplished by making communism illegal and persecuting anyone believed 
to be communist. The police had the liberty to stop and question anyone who looked suspicious 
and anyone whose ideas were considered dangerous to democracy. The creation of new 
hierarchical structures in the police, like the Departamento de Seguridad, with its Comité de 
Defensa contra el Comunismo are examples of how the structural changes were compatible with 
the new anticommunist ideology of the State. The Police as an institution has the ability to use 
                                                        
 
199 Paul Chevigny, Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas (New York: New Press, 1995), 26. 
 78 
force to “control people and impose order [but] controlling the level of violence is the essential 
problem of human rights in ordinary police work.”200 The police under the counterrevolutionary 
government was not able to control the use of force exerted over political opponents, and thus 
torture and human right abuses on the hands of the police became the norm.  
The other important issue analyzed in this thesis was the solidarity among university students 
during the revolutionary period. By criticizing Arbenz and his functionaries and aligning 
themselves with right-wing groups who fought under the banner of anticommunism, did the 
student associations like the AEU “betray” the revolution? No, the students in the AEU were 
more concerned to make sure the revolutionary ideals of democracy were upheld than to support 
or remain faithful to specific figures of the revolutionary government. However, by allying with 
the CEUA and accusing the government of violations, the AEU had the political effect of calling 
into question the extent of real change of the democratic government. Still, as a way to avoid 
criticism, or be blamed of favoritism for either government, in public the AEU maintained a 
position of being apolitical, even though clearly, the AEU was a political instrument for the 
students. In the same way, in 1956, despite claiming to be apolitical the students through their 
actions showed they had ideological and political positions that opposed the government.  
It is impossible to conclude from the information gathered whether the members of the 
CEUA were actually tortured. The Police archives do not contain, to my knowledge, evidence of 
torture during the revolution. The same was the case with the documents of the University 
Archives: while there was mention of a commission in charge of investigating the allegations, 
there were no documents listing their conclusions. Similarly, the newspapers did not report on 
the investigations of torture. It is clear that the CEUA took advantage of the situation by 
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publicizing and at times exaggerating their ordeal through their bulletins, describing horrific acts 
allegedly carried out by the police.  
Publicizing the alleged abuses provided the CEUA with a collection of stories that would aid 
their goal of destabilizing the government from abroad by making terror stories part of the 
propaganda against Arbenz. But if the police did commit abuses, would that mean the emphasis 
on transforming the police ethos was in vain? The answer to this question requires further 
research on the police during this period, to understand whether cases of abuse were frequent or 
isolated incidents. Then perhaps one could reach a conclusion as to whether the police as a whole 
was never reformed but simply continued using the same repressive practices they had developed 
under the Ubico dictatorship. Without proper oversight of the police, there is always possibility 
for the police to retain their old style of use of repressive force even in a new democratic regime. 
But if the incidents were isolated then it could be argued that their use of force corresponds to 
one of the two types of violence described by Chevigny in his book about police abuses in the 
U.S. and Latin America. The author makes a distinction between two types of police violence.  
The first is official violence, “calculated and directed at political enemies”; the second is “more 
routine police violence in dealing with crowds and crimes.” The second type can be considered 
‘police brutality’ meaning that certain members of the police are ‘out of control’, but the first 
type is deemed ‘political repression’ “a calculated act by a centralized authority.” 201 Thus if the 
allegations of torture against the students were product of ‘police brutality’, structural reforms to 
the police’s laws, creating more accountability, along with the democratic ideals would have 
made it more difficult for the police to abuse their power and for society to believe they were still 
an oppressive force.  
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However, during the counterrevolution, the combination of structural reforms with the new 
anticommunist ideal made it clear that police violence was a centralized act. The transformation 
of state institutions like the National Police, with their new rules and emphasis on destroying the 
enemy was the start of a doctrine of national security, which continued to develop with 
disastrous effects for Guatemala, given that all citizens who did not abide to the rules created by 
the new regimes were considered enemies. The Movimiento de Liberación began closing all the 
doors for a civic opposition; opponents in turn began to realize that change through political 
means would be almost impossible, and other means were needed. Beginning with the 
counterrevolution and throughout the war, “anyone who wanted to create a student movement 
was a sure candidate for the cemetery, that is if they buried him, if he didn’t just disappear 
without leaving trace, so the ones who had ideals, either they went to war, or they swallowed 
them [the ideals].”202 
The experiences of both right and left-winged university students, in terms of student 
organizing, playing a role of opposition and the interaction with the security forces, had an 
important impact on these students. Both the CEUA and the AEU developed very different ideas 
of what both administrations represented and some of their members continued having active 
organizational and political participation role in the country. Jorge Rosal, the twice president of 
the AEU eventually joined the Guatemalan guerrilla branch Organización del Pueblo en Armas, 
ORPA, he lived in exile for some time and in 1996 he was one of the signers of the Peace 
Accords.203 Roberto Díaz Castillo, the president of the AEU at the time of the 1954 coup was 
exiled to Chile, he eventually returned and continued working in the university. In 1980 his son 
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was killed by the army, prompting him to once again leave to exile, he returned in 1994 and to 
this date continues working in the University of San Carlos.204 Ricardo Ramirez de León, a 
member of the FUD during the revolution, became better known as Rolando Morán, a 
comandante of the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP, another Guatemalan guerrilla 
branch.205 Rolando Moran, also participated in the signing of the Peace Accords between the 
guerrilla and the army in 1996. Jose Barnoya continues to participate in the events of the Huelga 
de Dolores and is considered one of the most knowledgeable individuals about its history. Leonel 
Sisniega Otero and Mario Sandoval Alarcón continued with their political party MDN, which 
was later renamed Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN, the party of organized violence. 
Beginning in the 1960’s Sandoval Alarcón organized and directed paramilitary groups, later in 
his life he lost his voice, which he claimed was caused by the tortures he underwent while in 
prison during 1953. Both Sisniega Otero and Sandoval Alarcón also held political posts during 
the following military governments.  
 Finally, both periods provide insight into a complex set of relations among university 
students and between these student associations and the National Police.  Through the events of 
1952, students learned that democracy also entailed respecting the opposition and at times 
looking beyond ideologies and working alongside the anticommunists to demand that authorities 
behave according to the democratic rules. The interactions among these students were complex 
because while the CEUA wanted help protesting the government against alleged abuses, they 
were not willing to do the same when the roles were reversed in 1956. The political climate in 
which the events of June 1956 unfolded made it acceptable for conservative groups like the 
CEUA to praise and promote the use of institutionalized violence against other students. The 
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Police, as a protagonist in the events of 1952 and 1956, served as a mirror of the transformations 
as well as the mistakes of the political regimes in power. What the institution’s actual role was in 
1952 and in 1956, is still very much unknown, and these unknowns continued until 1996 when 
after the signing of the Peace Accords the institution was restructured. Therefore, it is necessary 
to continue uncovering the past about a force that played a key role in the country’s politics and 
in its recent history. The Police Archives will be able to provide valuable information that will 
lead to a better understanding of the issues that influenced the institutions not only during 
the1950’s but during the war as well. Guatemala is a country still suffering from the brutalities of 
its recent past, including the genocide against the indigenous population.  For those who were 
directly affected by state violence the Archives provide the possibility to learn the truth about 
their loved ones, and about how the Police committed acts of violence against its own citizens. 
The truth belongs to us all, studying and knowing it will hopefully help us to prevent the same 
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